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The Cochabamba Water War Social Movement: A Successful Challenge to Neoliberal 
Expansion in Bolivia? 
 





This thesis determines how the Cochabamba water war social movement, a movement 
protesting the privatization of the Cochabamba water system, impacted neoliberal policies 
in Bolivia. First, it examines the construction and implementation of the neoliberal model 
and responses to this model in the popular sector. This thesis finds that despite significant 
results at the international level, the transfer of the Cochabamba water system, SEMAPA, 
back to the public sector did not drastically improve water access or quality of water 
services. Finally, the research shows how the Coordinadora utilized diverse protest 
methods to fight against the privatization of water and to support direct political 
participation. The thesis concludes by arguing that despite the Coordinadora not 
achieving its goal of democratizing SEMAPA, it did succeed in challenging the 
expansion of the neoliberal policy of privatizing water by using protest methods involving 
direct political participation and democracy. 
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Posing the problem 
In 2000, the Bolivian government shocked the world by transferring control of the 
Cochabamba municipal water company, Servicio Municipal de Agua Potable de 
Cochabamba (SEMAPA) to Aguas Del Tunari, partially owned by transnational 
corporation Bechtel (Olivera et al, 2004: 8). This action, however, was not part of a new 
phenomenon but was one step in a decade long policy of Latin American governments 
privatizing various enterprises, such as telecommunications, gas, electricity and water 
sectors (Mackenzie et al., 2003: 163).  
The privatization policy was part of a larger neoliberal program of stabilization 
and structural adjustment measures that were developed by economists at the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other international financial institutions 
(IFIs) (Veltmeyer, 1997: 208). The neoliberal agenda of structural adjustment and market 
reforms (free market capitalism) was imposed on country after country based on the ideas 
integrated within the Washington Consensus and a ‘new world order.’ The Washington 
Consensus was developed in the early 1980s and provided a set of guidelines for 
international trade and economics (Williamson, 1993: 1332-1333). By the end of the 
1990s, only four Latin American countries had not adopted neoliberal policies 
(Veltmeyer, 1997: 209).  
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Since the mid-1980s, privatization had been a crucial part of the ‘new economic 
model’ and of international development policy (Kohl, 2004: 895). By 1998, more than 
one hundred countries had privatized previously state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
representing a total value of US $735 billion. While most of these privatizations involved 
profitable companies, the dynamics of this policy were radically transformed when it was 
expanded to water (Kohl, 2004: 895, Spronk and Webber, 2007: 40). The neoliberal 
policy of privatization, along with trade and capital liberalization, produced strong and 
widespread resistance. As of 1989, social protests against the neoliberal agenda were 
mobilized in numerous settings in Latin American countries (Veltmeyer, 1997: 236).  
However, the movement that emerged in 2000 during the water war to protest the 
privatization of the Cochabamba water system involved a different process (Olivera et al, 
2004: 28). It generated strong and diverse forces of resistance throughout the city to 
protest the privatization and, more generally, the imposition of neoliberal policies. This 
movement resulted in a struggle between a community coalition and government forces, 
eventually forcing the government to retract its privatization contract (Olivera et al, 2004: 
28).  
The war that erupted in Cochabamba over the privatization of water raised 
important questions about the viability of neoliberal policies, specifically privatization 
(Olivera et al, 2004: 141). The movement verbalized how since the 1980s, the Bolivian 
state had existed as a tool of the neoliberal apparatus, serving the interests of the national 
and international elite, rather than the needs of working people (Olivera et al, 2004: 141). 
The water war movement had a goal of ending this exploitation and creating a true 
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democracy, one that was run from below and allowed full participation and decision-
making of the general population (Olivera et al, 2004: 141). Its main goals were to block 
the privatization, to improve water delivery in Cochabamba, to challenge other neoliberal 
policies and to deepen Bolivian democracy. While this movement was part of a broader 
struggle against neoliberal and capitalist expansion, I will study the dynamics of this 
process of exploitation and resistance as they occurred in Cochabamba and how these 
dynamics were manifested (Olivera et al, 2004: 141).   
 
Emergence of Protests 
In Bolivia, the World Bank was primarily responsible for the government’s attempts to 
privatize municipal water systems in Cochabamba and El Alto, La Paz. In the mid-1990s, 
the World Bank made a loan to Bolivia to improve its public water systems and to 
encourage investment (Spronk and Webber, 2007: 39). The World Bank and the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB) made the privatization of the Cochabamba municipal 
water company, SEMAPA, a condition of continuing to receive loans, and recommended 
the elimination of controls over water prices (Olivera et al, 2004: 8). Generally, upper 
class Cochabamba citizens reacted modestly to the fee increases. However, working class 
and poor citizens could not afford the additional $30 monthly that came with the 
privatization (Olivera et al, 2004: 8).  
In Cochabamba, two months after the sale of SEMAPA to Aguas del Tunari, 
partially owned by transnational corporation Bechtel, rates were raised by as much as two 
hundred percent without service improvements (Bakker, 2008: 237). On average, 
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Cochabamba citizens received water for approximately four hours a day and the system 
covered fifty-seven percent of residents (Spronk and Webber, 2007: 39). The contract 
awarded by the government to Aguas del Tunari in 1999 encompassed expanding water 
production through the construction of a dam tunnel project that would cost 
approximately US $300 million. The contract guaranteed the company a return of fifteen 
to seventeen percent over the forty years of the contract (Spronk and Webber, 2007: 39). 
The contract gave Aguas del Tunari exclusive rights to all water in Cochabamba, such as 
rainwater and personal wells in rural communities (Bakker, 2008: 238). The company 
attempted to place water meters on private wells and local irrigation systems throughout 
rural Cochabamba to collect more profit. It was widely believed that the company had 
disrespected the cultural significance of water for the indigenous populations of the 
Andean highlands (Bakker, 2008: 238).  
The anti-privatization movement that followed was successful in ejecting Aguas 
del Tunari from Bolivia (Olivera et al, 2004: 8). Beginning in April 2000, the movement 
effectively mobilized diverse populations and held collective, citywide meetings to 
accurately portray the goals and needs of the collective group (Olivera et al, 2004: 56-57). 
Oscar Olivera, leader of the movement, helped form el Coordinadora de Defensa del 
Agua y de la Vida (the Coordinadora), a wide-spread coalition representing diverse 
populations fighting against the privatization of SEMAPA (Olivera et al, 2004: 28). 
 
Research Questions and Research Objectives 
The two main questions raised by the Cochabamba water war for my research are: 
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1) Did the movement fail or succeed in challenging the neoliberal agenda of 
privatizing water? 
2) What were the dynamics and outcomes of the movement? 
Secondary research questions: 
1) What were the main political, social, and legal institutions involved? 
2) Which actors and populations had crucial leadership roles? 
3) How were diverse populations organized under one unified movement? 
4) What potential exists to draw lessons from the methods and outcomes? 
               The objective of this thesis is to examine the dynamics, successes and outcomes 
of the anti-privatization movement in Cochabamba. By studying the water war as an 
historical event, researchers and scholars can investigate the dynamics of a specific time 
in Bolivian history. The thesis shows how a challenge to the neoliberal policy of 
privatization was manifested in relation to the specific political, economic and social 
conditions apparent in Bolivia at this time. To investigate the dynamics of this movement, 
the following issues will be examined: mobilization methods; the main political, social 
and legal institutions involved; the actors and populations with crucial leadership roles; 
how diverse populations were organized under one unified movement; and what potential 
exists to draw lessons from the movement’s methods and outcomes. This research will 
examine how anti-privatization movement leaders mobilize diverse populations with a 
variety of needs into one unified movement, using the protests against the privatization of 
the Cochabamba municipal water system as a case study.  
  9 
               The thesis will examine different theories of social movement organizing, the 
strengths and weaknesses of the specific organizing approach taken in Cochabamba and 
will draw conclusions about lessons that can be transferred to other social movements in 
Latin America. 
 
Conceptual and theoretical framework 
The main theoretical concept that I use is David Harvey’s concept of accumulation by 
dispossession. According to Spronk and Webber, the movements that emerged in Bolivia 
to protest the privatization of water and natural gas were examples of ‘accumulation by 
dispossession’ by ‘enclosing the commons.’ This process occurs through the sale of a 
previously state-owned enterprise to a transnational corporation or IFI, ultimately closing 
off access of natural resources to the general population. According to Harvey, Marx 
correctly highlighted processes of accumulation based on fraud, predation and violence 
(Spronk and Webber, 2007: 38).  
The research objectives are based on the following working ideas drawn from the 
literature reviewed in Chapter 2. These ideas will act as a thesis statement that will be 
either supported or disproved through the research. First, the movement was part of a 
global struggle of indigenous communities to protest and prevent the enclosing of the 
commons (Spronk and Webber, 2007: 32). Secondly, the government policy to privatize 
water was an assault on indigenous communities, their livelihoods, and their role as 
guardians of nature (Olivera et al, 2004: 8). Thirdly, the movement’s success was 
contingent on the ability of indigenous people to transform a local protest into a broad 
  10 
social movement (Olivera et al, 2004) and the social movement was fundamentally 
against neoliberalism and capitalism (Webber, 2009a: 182).  
The thesis will investigate the emergence of neoliberalism in Latin America and 
how the ideology was transferred to Bolivian society (Gwynne and Kay, 2005: 142). It 
will examine how the support of neoliberal policies by Bolivian elites led to the following 
consequences: the restructuring of the Bolivian economy leading to the privatization of 
previously state-owned enterprises; enhanced support for multi-national investment; and 
increased unemployment and poverty, ultimately leading to the water war of 2000 and the 
gas wars of 2003 and 2005. It will do so by detailing how the privatization of public 
utilities leads to inequality in access, increased user fees and greater inequality 
(Goldstein, 2005: 396). This thesis will establish how the water war started a broader 
process of political participation in which citizens actively questioned the policies of 
Bolivian neoliberal governments, IFIs such as the World Bank and the IMF, and Western 
governments. This process of questioning took place through active social movements 
involving large and diverse street mobilizations and protests that placed pressure on the 
national government (Spronk and Webber, 2007:41).  
 By examining in detail the specific goals and successes of the movement, this thesis 
will determine whether the movement was a direct challenge to the neoliberal policy of 
privatizing water. To determine the movement’s immediate impacts, its opposition to 
neoliberal based laws and its political ideologies will be examined (Olivera et al, 2004: 
28-29). Most significantly, the impact of the movement on Bolivia’s political trajectory 
will be investigated (Spronk and Webber, 2007: 41). The significance of the movement 
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was verbalized by current Bolivian President Evo Morales in an interview with Time 
magazine, “We needed to end that internal colonialism and return the land and its natural 
resources to those who have lived on it for so many hundreds of years, instead of putting 
our economy in the hands of the World Bank, the IMF and transnational corporations” 
(Shultz, 2008: 29).  
According to Jeffrey Webber, after fifteen years of neoliberal economic 
restructuring from 1985-2000, the dominance of elitist democracy and the deconstruction 
of popular movements, a left-indigenous social movement in Bolivia was reawakened 
with the Cochabamba water war in 2000. According to Webber, the uprising initiated a 
five-year protest cycle within the urban and rural populations, the indigenous majority 
and other exploited populations against privatization measures (Webber, 2009a: 2). 
 The following paragraphs outline the working ideas that make up the conceptual 
framework of this thesis. First, the movements that developed in Bolivia to protest the 
privatization of water and gas were examples of what David Harvey called ‘accumulation 
by dispossession’ through ‘enclosing the commons’ by privatizing previously state-
owned enterprises (Spronk and Webber, 2007: 38). According to Harvey, Karl Marx 
correctly highlighted processes of accumulating capital based on violence and argued that 
accumulation by dispossession led to a variety of social movements under a broad section 
of civil society. It has been argued by scholars and policy makers supportive of water 
privatization that water must be treated as an economic good and should be priced in a 
way to recover costs of production from its users (Spronk and Webber, 2007: 38).  
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The cases of water privatization in Cochabamba and El Alto, La Paz were 
examples of accumulation by dispossession, but they also represented the idea that not all 
dispossessions work as planned. Despite ideas that water is the new ‘blue gold’ of the 21st 
century, the increasing number of failed water privatization experiments showed that 
attempting to sell water to poor people in the developing world was more difficult than 
originally anticipated (Spronk and Webber, 2007: 38). 
Second, the government policy to privatize water was an assault on indigenous 
communities, livelihoods and their role as guardians of nature. In Bolivia, indigenous 
people understood water as a sacred entity, and they believed that their right to water was 
inherent and that it could not be sold (Olivera et al, 2004: 8). For rural people, the right to 
water was connected to traditional beliefs and customs dating back centuries. The ideas 
and traditions regarding water went beyond distribution and encompassed the belief that 
entire communities were to benefit from water access and that it should never be used for 
private profit (Olivera et al, 2004: 8).  
The protection of indigenous uses of water was used to argue against Law 2029 
and the privatization of the Cochabamba municipal water system (Ochoa et al, 2009: 75). 
Under Law 2029, and with the privatization of the municipal water system, the traditional 
indigenous uses and rights to water were not respected (Ochoa et al, 2009: 74). The 
protection of indigenous rights and opposition to Law 2029 were the basis of the water 
war movement. Law 2029 stated that the concession holder had the right to supply water 
to the entire area, which ignored and undermined the functioning of local water 
committees and irrigation systems (Ochoa et al, 2009: 75). The Coordinadora based its 
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actions on the idea that water was a collective right, and the slogan ‘Water is Ours’ was 
used at protest marches against the privatization of SEMAPA (Ochoa et al, 2009: 75). 
Next, the indigenous organizers transformed the movement from a local protest 
into a broad social movement. Social movement organizers connected the movement to 
customary uses of the commonly governed water supplies of indigenous communities that 
dated back centuries in rural Cochabamba (Webber, 2009a: 182). The privatization of 
water was a direct violation of these customary uses. Activists also emphasized the fact 
that water was a resource that was biologically and socially necessary for human life, and 
to privatize water was to privatize life itself. By re-articulating this notion, movement 
leaders illustrated that water scarcity and threats of privatization automatically impacted a 
multi-class, rural and urban portion of the population simultaneously (Webber, 2009a: 
183).  
Importantly, the water war developed a much broader scope than originally 
anticipated and turned into a broad social movement (Webber, 2009a: 199). At a mass 
assembly in September 2000, the Coordinadora demanded a Constituent Assembly to 
meet the interests of the indigenous and peasant majorities. The assembly was imagined 
to bring together all classes such as irrigators, urban workers, landless peasants, farmers, 
villagers, coca workers and indigenous communities. This assembly was meant to bring 
together all sectors of the population and to be “a new type of political action born out of 
civil society as a means to discuss and to decide public matters” (Webber, 2009a: 199). 
Through these actions, a wide variety of representatives from all classes would 
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collectively debate issues of political representation, social control and self-governance 
independently of the Bolivian state and IFIs (Webber, 2009a: 199). 
Lastly, the water war was an anti-imperialist and anti-neoliberal social movement. 
The dominant role of IFIs and multinational corporations in the privatization process 
encouraged the reemergence of the Bolivian anti-imperialist tradition (Webber, 2009a: 
183). Feelings of solidarity, an oppositional consciousness and a greater knowledge of the 
influence of mass protests led to the radicalization of protest demands between 2000 and 
2005 (Webber, 2009a: 183).  
The need for political reform resulted from the repressive policies of the World 
Bank, the IMF and the IDB, which impacted the actions of the Bolivian government and 
led to the spread of social activism (Olivera et al, 2004: 8-15, Kohl, 2006: 305 and 
Perreault, 2006: 156). When asked about anti-neoliberal sentiments within the structure of 
the water war movement, movement leader Omar Fernandez explained “… It was in 
Cochabamba, where a situation emerged that extended throughout the entire country, in 
which the people were no longer prepared to continue with the [neoliberal] model” 
(Webber, 2009a: 184). 
 
Research Methodology 
The research methodology encompasses secondary sources such as books written by 
social activists about movement organizing and by academics about the political economy 
of natural resource privatization in Bolivia. I reviewed academic studies that explored the 
theoretical debates surrounding water use in Latin America, the background of the 
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Cochabamba water war, and social movement organizing in Latin America (Bakker, 
2007: 441). The research drew predominately on the writings of movement leader Oscar 
Olivera in which he examined the origins of the protests, organizing methods and 
dynamics, the diverse populations involved, and the movement’s implications. Olivera’s 
work was used to provide a unique and personal perspective on the water war that a 
scholar or researcher would not have access to if they did not participate directly in the 
movement. His writings were combined with a more objective and scholarly analysis of 
the goals and immediate outcomes of the water war social movement (Oliver et al, 2004: 
56-57).  
I will also investigate the emergence of privatization in Bolivia and its impact on 
social movements. This research examined the relationships between the IMF and the 
World Bank and Bolivian presidents such as Paz Estensorro in 1985 (Kohl, 2004:  896). I 
worked on understanding the development of the New Economic Plan (NEP) that led to a 
reduction in government spending, the closure of numerous state mines and the firing of 
25,000 miners (Kohl, 2004:  896). I also examined laws passed by Bolivian presidents to 
increase privatization efforts, and the impact of the laws and government actions on social 
movement organizing in the country. I formed an understanding of the local dimensions 
of privatization in Bolivia and examine how domestic elites sustained neoliberal policies 
(Kaup, 2012: 2). 
Secondary sources were used to gain a broad understanding of the context of 
social movement organizing in Bolivia and Latin America. Books published by 
Cambridge University Press and South End Press, for example, will be used to examine 
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social movements in Latin America prior to and during the neoliberal interventions of the 
World Bank and the IMF. The books were used to investigate the history, methods and 
impacts of anti-privatization movements in Latin America that challenged the 
privatization of water, gas, telecommunications and electrical systems (Olivera et al, 
2004: 8-15; Kaup, 2012: 2).  
               Information on other anti-privatization movements in Latin America found in 
books written by community organizations and academics were used to examine different 
methods of public collective action, including boycotts and mass protests (Rhodes, 2006: 
3-4). What was emphasized here was whether anti-privatization movements in other 
countries achieved a significant restructuring of economic and political policies in their 
respective countries. Also, through government websites, libraries, archives, scholarly 
books and articles and statistical databases, the efficiency of SEMAPA in providing 
consistent and quality access to water to Cochabamba residents were investigated. These 
areas were researched to place the water war within a broader context of neoliberal and 
imperial expansion in Latin America.   
               Based on the nature of the research, qualitative data was utilized more 
extensively than quantitative. Interviews, personal stories and histories were related to the 
collective mobilization and organization of diverse populations and the challenges 
experienced by individual organizers. For quantitative data, a very limited variety will be 
examined, for example, the number of movement participants across different regions of 
Cochabamba and the country, the percentage of rural populations who obtained access to 
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water following the protests, and statistical data on funding levels that were transferred 
into Latin America from the United States government (Bakker, 2008: 239).  
               A document review was conducted with data from reports from the Cochabamba 
Municipal Government, the Archives and National Library of Bolivia (ABNB), museum 
archives, newspapers such as Los Tiempos, university libraries such as at the Universidad 
Mayor de San Simon in Cochabamba, the SEMAPA office, and NGO reports from Solar 
Water Disinfection and Water for People (SODIS). The goals of this review were used to 
gain a broad understanding of the issues impacting water access in the area and to provide 
a local perspective of the movement through the use of secondary data. 
 
Thesis Statement 
My thesis is that the Coordinadora halted the neoliberal agenda to privatize water 
in Cochabamba, Bolivia through achieving its basic goals of reversing the privatization of 
SEMAPA and ejecting Aguas del Tunari from Bolivia. The movement challenged the 
neoliberal agenda of privatizing water through becoming a symbol for the international 
campaign for the human right to water, transforming the Bolivian political landscape, 
transferring more attention to communal water rights and inspiring other movements 
protesting the privatization of water (Spronk and Webber, 2007: 21; Shultz, 2008: 29; 
Boelens, Getches and Guevara-Gill, 2010: 288; Spronk, 2009:169, and Dangl, 2007: 70). 
The success of the movement to stop the privatization of water was contingent on leaders’ 
abilities to organize broad and diverse populations through the use of open and public 
assemblies based on principles and practices of direct political participation and 
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democracy (Olivera et al, 2004: 56-57).  Despite the movement’s successes, it did not 
achieve its broader goals of radically democratizing SEMAPA, of expanding water 
access, and of improving the quality of services under the SEMAPA system (Spronk and 
Webber, 2007: 41).   
 To protest the privatization of water in Cochabamba in 2000, movement leaders 
mobilized workers, peasants, children, the elderly, labour leaders, business people, 
community organizations, irrigator associations, water cooperatives and middle class 
citizens into one unified movement (Olivera et al, 2004: 34). To do so, Oscar Olivera 
formed the Coordinadora to enhance democratic decision-making by monitoring and 
challenging government and business actions, interpreting the demands of the general 
population and leading mass protests to challenge oppressive government policies 
(Olivera et al, 2004: 28-29).  
Structure of the thesis argument  
The thesis begins with a broad introduction to the topic area, with a description of 
research objectives and an investigation of research methodologies. Next, it provides a 
background to the emergence of neoliberalism in Latin America, privatization in Bolivia, 
and the water war protest movement in Cochabamba.  
               Chapter 2 provides a literature review that examines areas of relevance in 
understanding the outcomes and impacts of the movement’s affects on the expansion of 
the neoliberal policy of privatization. It examines the construction and emergence of the 
new economic model of neoliberal globalization and how the popular sector responded to 
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this model in Latin America. The chapter investigates the origins and dynamics of the 
water war movement focusing predominately on David Harvey’s accumulation by 
dispossession concept and the expansion of the global water industry (Spronk and 
Webber, 2007: 32 and Barlow and Clarke, 2002: 109). The chapter continues with an 
examination of the dominant views of the movement in Cochabamba. 
               Chapter 3 provides the context for an examination of the issues related to the 
research problematic of the thesis. It examines the global expansion of the neoliberal 
model in addition to the model’s expansion in Latin America and Bolivia. The chapter 
continues to investigate the conditions leading to the movement in Cochabamba, and the 
movement itself. The chapter ends with an investigation of the implications of 
neoliberalism in Bolivia.  
               Chapters 4 and 5 provide a careful analysis of the available empirical data that 
will either support or disprove the numerous working ideas stated earlier in the chapter. It 
utilizes various analysis methods to investigate the origins and dynamics of the 
movement. 
In Chapter 6, broad conclusions are drawn regarding the immediate impact and 
broader significance of the movement formed to protest the Bolivian government’s 
privatization agenda regarding water. The conclusion supports the working ideas of the 
thesis coming from a detailed analysis of several studies by Webber and Spronk, an 
analysis of the social movement dynamics of the Cochabamba water war, and the 




This thesis focuses solely on the time period from 2000 to 2006, starting with the 
Cochabamba water war social movement and concluding with the period immediately 
preceding the election of indigenous president, Evo Morales. Therefore, this thesis 
focuses solely on the political environment during this period, and does not investigate 
the nature of Morales’ policies and whether they were impacted by the Cochabamba 
victory in addition to the actions and influence of the Coordinadora currently in Bolivia. 
This investigation is also based on one specific time period and social movement, and 
does not acknowledge how other factors during the 2000 to 2006 time period could have 
affected the political environment in the country.  
The decision to focus this thesis solely on the 2000-2006 time period was based 
on the events that took place in Bolivia during this time. The Cochabamba water war 
started a period of growth for strong and diverse social movements that aimed to 
challenge the neoliberal policy of privatizing natural resources. This thesis strives to 
examine the political dynamics of the Cochabamba water war social movement, a specific 
time period in Bolivian history. It also investigates the immediate impacts of the 
movement’s achievements of reversing the privatization of SEMAPA and ejecting Aguas 
del Tunari from Bolivia, such as initiating a five-year protest cycle challenging the 
neoliberal agenda of privatization, eventually leading to the forced resignation of two 
neoliberal presidents, and to the eventual election of Evo Morales, at the time considered 
a victory for the social movements (Bakker, 2008: 239).   
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An investigation of this short time period enables the reader to understand which 
political events were the direct results of what the movement was able to achieve, and 
which events were impacted by international and global actors, as opposed to local social 
movements. By showing statistics of SEMAPA coverage in the immediate period 
following the movement, the thesis shows that the efforts of the Coordinadora did not 
directly lead to improved quality and coverage under SEMAPA. This shows that while 
the movement was able to achieve its basic goal of reversing SEMAPA’s privatization, it 
did not expand its efforts and focus to encompass how the social dynamics of the 
SEMAPA union could have acted as a barrier to improve the quality and expand the 














The Cochabamba Water War:  
A Literature Review 
 
In 2000, the Bolivian government made the politically contentious decision to transfer the 
control of the Cochabamba municipal water company, Servicio Municipal de Agua 
Potable de Cochabamba (SEMAPA) to transnational corporation, Aguas del Tunari 
(Olivera et al, 2004: 8). While this action shocked the world, the privatization of natural 
resources was not part of a new phenomenon, but one step in a decade-long policy of the 
privatization of public utilities in Latin America, such as telecommunications, electrical, 
and water systems (Mackenzie et al, 2003: 163). Through a strong and diverse 
community coalition led by Oscar Olivera and el Coordinadora de Defensa del Agua y de 
la Vida (the Coordinadora), the anti-privatization social movement during the water war 
succeeded in expelling the transnational corporation from Bolivia and transferred control 
of the municipal water system back to the public sector (Oliver et al, 2004: 8). 
      The purpose of this chapter is to review the literature surrounding the water war 
in Cochabamba and to reconstruct the dynamics of the anti-neoliberal social movement 
behind this war. It is divided into the following sections: 
[1] Construction and implementation of the new economic model (neoliberal 
globalization). In the context of an expanding debt crisis in the 1980s, neoliberal policies 
were constructed and enforced by a transnational class of global capitalists supported by 
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the World Bank, the IMF and other institutions (Veltmeyer, 1997: 208). The neoliberal 
agenda of economic reforms include the following practices: liberalization of trade and 
capital flows, the privatization of previously state-owned enterprises or industries, market 
de-regulation and significant cutbacks in public spending (Veltmeyer, 1997: 208; 
Gwynne and Kay, 2000: 150). This literature review focuses on the privatization policy of 
neoliberal reforms. In the Cochabamba case, this involved the transfer of control of the 
municipal water system from public actors to private companies, leading to higher user 
fees for city residents (Olivera et al, 2004: 8-9). 
  [2] Responses to this model in the popular sector. In response to the neoliberal 
program of structural reforms, a variety of movements emerged in the 1980s, shifting the 
struggle from rural to urban areas (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2009: 39). In the 1990s in the 
context of increasing disapproval of neoliberal policies, movements emerged that 
attempted to establish alternatives to the neoliberal system. These movements were led by 
peasant classes, were political in nature, and represented resistance to the neoliberal 
agenda (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2009: 39). During this time, indigenous and peasant 
movements used social mobilization as a method to challenge local and national elections 
and joined international development associations to construct viable alternatives to the 
neoliberal model (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2009: 40). In Cochabamba, in response to 
reduced access and the privatization of the city’s ‘water commons,’ a dramatic and 
diverse movement emerged to protest the privatization pillar of the neoliberal model and 
to transfer control of the municipal water company back to the public sector (Spronk and 
Webber, 2007: 32). 
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 3]  The origins and dynamics of the 2000 Water War movement. The movement’s 
emergence to protest the privatization of the municipal water system was contingent on 
the extreme price increases, the universal importance of water for human and community 
survival, and in sustaining cultural traditions. In addition to a strong focus on higher water 
prices, Webber (2009a: 182) states that the movement was considered an anti-neoliberal 
and anti-imperialist social movement in which indigenous peoples emphasized the 
importance of water for their cultural traditions. In addition, Webber (2009a: 183) 
emphasizes the macro-focus of the protests and the dominant role of IFIs and multi-
national corporations in encouraging the emergence of an anti-neoliberal and anti-
imperialist consciousness in Bolivia and in challenging hegemonic forms of power and 
exploitation.  
Because of the uniqueness of water as a natural resource necessary for human 
survival and the emergence of a struggle to protest the privatization of a publicly owned 
good, the success of this social movement to expel a foreign company and to halt the 
expansion of the neoliberal policy of privatizing water has attracted significant scholarly 
attention (Webber, 2009a: 183, Spronk and Webber, 2007: 38, Perreault, 2008: 835, 
Shultz, 2009: 17). Scholars are interested in understanding the origins, dynamics, and the 
immediate successes, outcomes and implications of this unique anti-neoliberal and anti-
imperialist social movement protesting extreme price hikes in the water sector.  
The problematic action of the Bolivian government to privatize the Cochabamba 
municipal water system and the impacts of this action will be examined (Mackenzie et al, 
2003: 163). This government action was not part of a new phenomenon but was one step 
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in a decade-long policy of Latin American governments privatizing previously state-
owned enterprises, for example telecommunications, electricity, transportation, water and 
hydrocarbon systems (Mackenzie et al, 2003: 163). The Cochabamba protest questioned 
the effectiveness of neoliberal policies that were encompassed in the ‘new economic 
order’ (Olivera et al, 2004: 141 and Kohl, 2004: 895). As is the case in Bolivia, 
privatization of water and other natural resources was an extreme application of 
neoliberal policies and generated strong and diverse forces of resistance (Olivera et al, 
2004: 28). 
     This review of the literature is based on the following research questions:  
1) What were the origins of the new economic model of neoliberal globalization? 
2) What were the responses to the neoliberal model in the popular sectors? 
3) What were the origins and dynamics of the Water War protest movement? 
 
The new economic model (neoliberal globalization) 
The neoliberal agenda of economic reforms included the following principles: 
liberalization of trade and capital flows, the privatization of previously state-owned 
enterprises or industries, market de-regulation and significant cutbacks in public spending 
(Veltmeyer, 1997: 208 and Gwynne and Kay, 2000: 150). Governments in Latin America 
privatized the telecommunications, electricity, transportation, water and hydrocarbon 
sectors (Mackenzie et al, 2003: 163). In practice, the implementation of neoliberal 
policies involved wage freezes and cutbacks in public health, public education and state-
sector employment, currency devaluation, price increases on consumer goods and tax 
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hikes (Almedia, 2007: 126). According to Latin American treasury ministers, it became 
necessary for economies to modernize to become more competitive in the global capitalist 
market. Economic modernization was considered necessary for governments to attract 
foreign investment from transnational corporations with various investment options 
across the continent (Gwynne and Kay, 2000: 142). 
In the context of an expanding debt crisis in the 1980s, neoliberal reforms were 
constructed and enforced by a newly developed class of transnational capitalists 
supported by the World Bank, the IMF and other institutions (Veltmeyer, 1997: 208). 
Neoliberal adjustments and market reforms were imposed on country after country so by 
the end of the 1980s, only four countries in Latin America had not opened their 
economies to the global market by liberalizing imports and removing regulations on the 
flow of capital (Veltmeyer, 1997: 209). The pressure to implement market-oriented 
reforms came from formally binding agreements between national governments and the 
international lending institutions that allowed indebted national governments to re-pay 
past loans or to secure new lines of credit (Almedia, 2007: 127).  
During the 1980s and 1990s, the neoliberal model gained global influence 
(Gwynne and Kay, 2000: 142). This period saw the collapse of Soviet Russia and the 
state-led economic model. The introduction of neoliberal reforms in certain parts of 
Europe and the smooth transition from state to market-led economies gave Latin 
American governments incentives to adopt these programs (Gwynne and Kay, 2000: 
142). Latin American politicians understood that neoliberal principles were the basis of 
competitive industrial economies (Gwynne and Kay, 2000: 142). In developing countries, 
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neoliberal reforms were intended to create a more favourable environment for 
transnational capital by removing trade and market barriers and creating a more flexible 
workforce to provide cheap labour to transnational corporations (Goldstein, 2005: 395). 
Privatization had been a critical feature of the ‘new economic model’ and 
international development policy since the mid-1980s (Kohl, 2004: 895). The 
privatization model was part of a larger neoliberal policy of stabilization and structural 
adjustment, constructed by the World Bank, the IMF and other IFIs (Veltmeyer, 1997: 
208). Massive privatization efforts in England and the United States led to significant 
incentives for national governments in Latin America to adopt these programs (Kohl, 
2004: 895). By 1998, more than one hundred countries globally had privatized previously 
state-owned industries, representing a value of approximately US $735 billion in profits. 
Privatization was used as a political strategy to re-define the role of the government in 
developing countries and Eastern Europe (Kohl, 2004: 895).  
Supporters of privatization argued that private companies were more efficient than 
all levels of government and were better able to process information, respond to the needs 
of the market, and allocate resources (Kohl, 2004: 895). Supporters argued that it should 
lead to the creation of more efficient companies, a reduction in corruption and faster 
economic growth. However, it did not automatically benefit broader society and could 
lead to significant job loss as managers attempt to cut costs (Kohl, 2004: 895). 
Additionally, privatization of infrastructure could impact consumers by changing their 
access to the network, the prices they paid for services, and service quality. Also, 
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privatization could have indirect impacts on consumers as it could change the prices of 
substitute goods (Mackenzie et al, 2003: 170). 
While most privatizations involved profitable companies in hydrocarbon or other 
sectors, the dynamics of the policy were transformed when water began to be privatized 
by national governments in Latin America (Spronk and Webber, 2007: 38). During the 
post World War II period, water was considered a public good to be provided by publicly 
owned companies, since the private sector was unable to provide adequate services. The 
World Bank extended infrastructure loans to assist in the development of public water 
sources because it believed that investments in public services would enhance economic 
growth (Spronk and Webber, 2007: 38). 
Since the expansion of neoliberal policies, however, the World Bank began 
attaching conditions to government loans requiring the privatization of publicly owned 
water resources to improve management methods (Spronk and Webber, 2007: 38). 
Supporters of water privatization argued that water should be considered an economic 
good with the full cost of its production extracted from its users. Neoliberal arguments 
claimed that users would waste water if they were not required to pay its full cost and, 
therefore, privatization was considered a solution to the global scarcity of fresh water 
(Spronk and Webber, 2007: 38).  
In response, the international campaign to define water as a human right grew 
significantly in the late 1990s (Bakker, 2007: 436). The campaign had its origins in the 
arguments of anti-privatization advocates who fought against numerous privatization 
contracts on different continents. Advocates of privately supplied water systems, such as 
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private companies, many governments, bilateral aid agencies and transnational 
corporations, argued that it increased efficiency and quality of the water utility and 
expanded access to excluded populations (Bakker, 2007: 436). These actors pointed to the 
failures of governments and aid agencies to achieve the goal of universal water access set 
during the International Water and Sanitation Decade (1981-1990) and to the low 
efficiency of public utilities (Bakker, 2007: 436).   
Opponents of this view argued that water access was a human right  (Bakker, 
2007: 437). They based their arguments on two main justifications: the fact that water is 
essential for human life, and that many human rights as defined by the United Nations 
(UN) are dependent on access to water. Opponents also pointed to successful examples of 
public water systems and claimed that privately operated water utilities were not 
automatically more efficient, but could be more expensive for users. They also argued 
that private companies would not run water utilities in a sustainable manner (Bakker, 
2007: 437).  
 
Responses to the new economic model in the popular sector 
 
In response to a neoliberal program of ‘structural reform’ advanced within the framework 
of the ‘new world order’ during the 1980s, the class struggle shifted from the rural areas 
to urban centres. The struggle for social change in Latin America took place within three 
distinct stages (Veltmeyer and Petras, 2008: 22). The first protest stage occurred in the 
1960s in which organized workers and peasant revolutionaries formed diverse movements 
led by urban middle class intellectuals (Veltmeyer and Petras, 2008: 22). Both the urban-
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centred labour movement and peasant struggles for land autonomy made substantial gains 
in advancing the class struggle. However, by the end of the 1970s, most of these 
movements were defeated through the state implementing different models of state-led or 
community-based development, the corruption of movement leaders, and in extreme 
cases, outright violent repression (Veltmeyer and Petras, 2008: 22).  
In the 1980s, Latin America experienced the emergence of social movements 
originating within civil society and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) made up of 
the urban poor and the middle class (Veltmeyer and Petras, 2008: 22). The urban poor 
participated in spontaneous protests against authoritarian governments and the programs 
of the IMF and the World Bank. Categorized as ‘new social movements,’ the working 
class began to reorganize itself to advance its interests, in the case of Brazil, by setting up 
a political party (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2009: 39).  
These movements were categorized as ‘new’ because of the subjectivity and 
diversity of their goals, methods and conditions, their broad social base and their basic 
concerns. In the 1980s, these movements were understood as a new social actor in the 
political field, rather than as challenging state power (Veltmeyer and Petras, 2008: 23). In 
contrast to the political and class based goals of movements in previous decades, these 
‘new social movements’ led by NGOs were focused on single issues such as human 
rights, demanding title to plots of land and ending violence against women (Veltmeyer, 
1997: 147).  
At the end of the 1980s a new wave of social movements emerged including the 
Brazilian Landless Rural Workers Movement (MST) in Brazil, the largest, most dynamic 
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and most powerful movement in Latin America (Veltmeyer and Petras, 2008: 23). Unlike 
the ‘new’ social movements of the 1980s, these movements were formed in rural areas 
and were both peasant-led and peasant-based. Many of these movements also had ethnic 
or national bases in indigenous communities of peasant farmers, as was the case in 
Bolivia, Ecuador and Mexico (Veltmeyer and Petras, 2008: 23).  
In the 1990s, in the context of increasing disapproval of neoliberal policies and 
attempts to construct development alternatives, a new form of peasant-based and led 
social movements began to take form and gain strength. These movements were political 
in nature and represented resistance against the expansion of neoliberal policies (Petras 
and Veltmeyer, 2009: 39). By the mid-1990s, the rural movements based on the landless 
peasants and, in some contexts, the struggles of peasant and indigenous organizations 
were taken to urban areas. The movements also used connections with the urban-centred 
and middle class ‘civil society’ to advance its goals (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2009: 40). 
During this time, peasant and indigenous movements used social mobilization as a 
method to challenge local and national elections. The movements also joined international 
development associations seeking to construct a more participatory form of development 
and politics in addition to a new perspective of local and sustainable human development 
(Petras and Veltmeyer, 2009: 40). The diverse social movements investigated below place 





The Brazilian Landless Rural Workers Movement (MST) 
The MST was the most vocal, most efficiently organized and most effective of the many 
peasant-based social movements calling for ‘land, democracy and social justice.’ It was a 
national peasant organization created in 1984 to advocate for and pursue agrarian reform 
by occupying unused lands (Robles, 2001: 147). The MST provided a theoretical 
framework to examine the structural, environmental, economic and political exploitation 
in rural areas and provided a practical guideline for peasants to voice their concerns 
through collective action (Robles, 2001: 148). It grew from a regional movement based in 
the south-central region of the country into a national movement with organizers in all 
regions of the country (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2011: 75).  
The MST was not categorized as a revolutionary movement and did not attempt to 
appropriate state power (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2011: 75). Instead, it effectively enforced 
the implementation of the Constitution that supported the appropriation of unused lands 
for social use. In the mid 1990s, the MST began to organize large land occupations near 
provincial cities to encourage mass support and to form alliances with urban actors 
(Petras and Veltmeyer, 2011: 75). As the movement occupied large uncultivated 
properties, the MST experienced increasing violence and was forced to create self-
defense committees to protect participants against gunmen hired by landowners. 
Throughout the 1990s, the MST organized approximately 139,000 families into 
productive cooperatives with many of them participating in export agriculture (Petras and 
Veltmeyer, 2011: 75). They also expropriated 7.2 million hectares of land and established 
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fifty-five rural cooperatives in twelve states and 880 schools with 38,000 students (Petras 
and Veltmeyer, 2011: 75).  
Attempts at analysis question whether the movement had a socialist nature or if it 
was focused on maximizing benefits available under capitalism (Petras and Veltmeyer, 
2011: 77). According to Petras and Veltmeyer (2011: 77), the practice of the MST was 
predominately to advance the land struggle within the limits of Brazilian politics and 
economics. The movement did this by mobilizing land occupations, in contrast to 
protesting against the government’s neoliberal policies. The MST generated relationships 
with a variety of organizations in the anti-globalization movement and helped create a 
network of organizations concerned with creating alternatives to neoliberal globalization 
(Petras and Veltmeyer, 2011: 77).  
 
The Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities (CONAIE) – Ecuador 
CONAIE is considered one of the most powerful indigenous movements uniting 
indigenous peoples across race and class by developing relationships with other social 
movements and by holding mass protests to force the national government to meet their 
demands (Andolina, 2003: 721). CONAIE mobilized indigenous populations of the 
lowlands and highlands and created a platform combining their material and cultural 
needs. It was based on the communal control of land, government programs, education, 
natural resources and infrastructure (Andolina, 2003: 727).  
The main goal of the movement was to remove the ‘oligarchs’ who caused misery 
for the majority of Ecuadorians from state power by electing a popular constituent 
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assembly that would enhance social justice by introducing a newly established 
plurinational state.  CONAIE also called for a constituent assembly that would legalize 
and support indigenous rights and that would re-establish Ecuador as a plurinational state 
(Petras and Veltmeyer, 2011: 78). This assembly was constructed in 1997-8 after the fall 
of President Abdala Bucaram in February 1997 (Andolina, 2003: 721). When the 
assembly concluded in 1998, the new constitution legalized new indigenous rights, 
citizenship rights and constitutive principles (Andolina, 2003: 722).   
In 1990, mass mobilization and political pressure occurred to respond to the 
following events: the government’s implementation of neoliberal policies; increasing 
class conflicts over land access and distribution; and pressuring the government to 
eliminate the neoliberal model and to implement an alternative political framework 
(Petras and Veltmeyer, 2011: 78). In practice, opposing the neoliberal agenda took the 
form of indigenous popular parliaments in 1991. These parliaments were understood as 
challenging the neoliberal agendas of political elites who contrasted the movement with 
market-based development and state sovereignty (Andolina, 2003: 728). With the 
coordinated support of urban actors and organizations, CONAIE transformed into a 
movement of historical significance, leading to its emergence as a major actor in national 






The Zapatista Movement of National Liberation (EZLN) 
In January 1994, the day after the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came 
into affect, the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) emerged from the jungle 
armed with weapons to seize towns in the highlands of Chiapas Mexico (Martinez-
Torrez, 2001: 349). Veltmeyer (2000, p. 92) explains that in the Mexican countryside, 
many peasant indigenous producers were forcibly separated from their means of 
production, leading to a higher number of landless producers, unemployed workers and 
proletarianized peasants. According to movement leader Subcombarte Marcos and the 
EZLN, the Mexican state sustained imperialism and its neoliberal agenda of economic 
reforms (Veltmeyer, 2000: 93). EZLN began the national political debate on issues of 
NAFTA, democratization, and social justice. Similarly to other powerful movements in 
Latin America, the EZLN attempted to combine social struggles with efforts to establish 
social transformation (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2011: 90).  
The EZLN had diverse protest and mobilization methods. Movement leaders 
made an appeal to civil society for a national mobilization against the neoliberal agenda 
that emerged in 1985 (Veltmeyer, 2000: 98). In addition, leaders held a ‘grand national 
consultation’ for the public to help determine its own role in democratic transformation. 
Significantly, the movement formed a national indigenous forum followed by a national 
indigenous congress to challenge neoliberal expansion and to enforce land reform and re-
distribution (Veltmeyer, 2000: 98). The movement organized open forums and national 
and international gatherings to encourage free discussion. The Zapatistas combined 
traditional protest strategies with widespread Internet use to expand international support 
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for the struggle and to make the international community aware of the movement, its 
goals and its discontents (Martinez-Torrez, 2001: 353). 
Since the initial uprising in 1994, the EZLN experienced substantial shifts in 
perspectives. According to Petras and Veltmeyer (2011: 91), through speeches and 
interviews with Macros and other EZLN leaders, it is clear that the movement narrowed 
its goals. The initial broad focus of social transformation shifted to emphasizing 
democratization, demilitarization and political transition (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2011: 
91). The narrowing of its goals came with a broadening of international support while 
simultaneously limiting the building of a national movement beyond Chiapas (Petras and 
Veltmeyer, 2011: 92).  
Since 1994, the movement had made efforts to organize social and political actors 
of opposition, to protect its way of life in a changing global environment, to politicize the 
peasantry, to unify the national indigenous movement, to establish itself as a national 
political actor and to protest against the expansion of the neoliberal agenda in the country 
(Veltmeyer, 2000: 97). For the EZLN, land distribution was connected to the autonomy 
and self-governance of indigenous peoples. Similarly to Bolivia, Ecuador and Paraguay, 
the Mexican state attempted to disconnect indigenous cultural issues from socio-
economic conditions (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2011: 93).  
 
The new peasant movement in Bolivia: The Cocaleros 
In the 1990s, the labour force resisted neoliberal and imperial expansion and capitalist 
exploitation (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2011: 84). In Bolivia, forces of resistance included 
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peasants in the south and mining and trade unions in La Paz. These groups were 
coordinated by the Bolivian Workers’ Confederation (COB), which organized street 
venders, students, professionals, women, ecologists and indigenous peasants, with each 
distinct population having its own delegates (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2011: 84).  
With the dominance of the miners within the COB receding because of the 
neoliberal reforms of the Paz Zamora government, coca farmers and traditional peasant 
producers emerged as influential actors (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2011: 84). The 
independence of the peasant movement was enhanced by the efforts of former miners 
such as Filomen Escobar who brought organizing expertise and leadership to the 
movement (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2011: 84). Other leaders such as current president Evo 
Morales and Alejo Velez Lazo also brought knowledge from rural areas to the broader 
Bolivian population. The movement that emerged had demands for land redistribution, 
cultural independence and the valuing of traditional indigenous beliefs and ways of life 
(Petras and Veltmeyer, 2011: 84).  
Similarly to the Zapatistas in Mexico, this ‘new peasant movement’ connected 
challenges of land re-distribution and autonomy to American political and military 
interference in the country (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2011: 85). Sections of the movement 
considered combining diverse protest strategies with electoral politics, which encouraged 
debate about the interdependence between social movements and politics (Petras and 
Veltmeyer, 2011: 85). Dissatisfied with the actions of local and national parties, the 
peasant movement formed the Assembly for the Sovereignty of the Peoples (ASP), which 
won a dozen elections in coca-growing regions. The cocaleros or coca workers proposed 
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the party as a national alternative that would give peasants substantial national policy-
making influence (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2011: 85).  
While land issues continued to be crucial for coca growers in the movement, the 
focus shifted to issues of free trade and American attempts to eliminate coca production 
(Petras and Veltmeyer, 2011: 85). The protection of coca was based on the cultural and 
spiritual importance of the coca leaf and its representation of indigenous autonomy and 
independence (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2011: 85). The indigenous-peasant movement 
experienced challenges with the national government’s neoliberal policies that ignored 
indigenous demands and Bolivian action against coca. The movement critiqued national 
Leftist policies and claimed that government served the interests of neoliberal elites 
(Petras and Veltmeyer, 2011: 85).  
The coca farmers of Chapare led by Morales were some of the main opponents of 
the Paz Zamora government (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2011: 86). When the government 
announced a plan in May 1996 to completely eradicate surplus coca production, the 
Bolivian Rural Workers’ Confederation responded by calling peasant farmers to arms to 
protect themselves and their families. The enhanced role of American advisors and agents 
in the daily political affairs of the country increased the nationalist and anti-imperialist 
nature of the struggle (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2011: 86). The struggle involving peasant 
producers and coca farmers’ enhanced national consciousness and attention towards 
indigenous issues, autonomy, culture and rights. As the COB became integrated into 
internal conflicts and its leaders integrated within the government, initiative for social 
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action shifted to other societal sectors, especially towards the militant peasant movement 
(Petras and Veltmeyer, 2011: 86).  
Responses to the neoliberal model in Latin America were diverse, focusing on a 
variety of goals such as challenging local and national elections, agrarian reform, 
indigenous autonomy, democratization, social justice and challenging American military 
interference (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2009: 40, Robles, 2001: 147, Andolina, 2003: 721, 
Veltmeyer, 2000: 93, Petras and Veltmeyer, 2011: 85). In Cochabamba in 2000, this 
challenge to neoliberal policies shifted from focusing on broader issues of autonomy 
toward protesting the privatization of the municipal water system in addition to reduced 
access and higher user fees (Olivera et al, 2004: 8-9). This movement was unique because 
it protested the privatization of a natural resource necessary for human survival and the 
health of the environment (Spronk and Webber, 2007: 32). 
 
Origins and dynamics of the Water War 
This section reviews the theorization of the privatization of water and other ‘commons,’ 
details the expansion of the global water market and investigates the dynamics of the 
water war movement in Cochabamba, Bolivia in 2000. 
The movements that developed in Bolivia to protest the privatization of water and 
gas were examples of movements that emerged to challenge what David Harvey called 
‘accumulation by dispossession’ through ‘enclosing the commons’ by privatizing 
previously state-owned enterprises (Spronk and Webber, 2007: 32). According to Harvey, 
Karl Marx correctly highlighted processes of capital accumulation based on violence and 
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argued that accumulation by dispossession led to a variety of social movements under a 
broad section of civil society. As a result of the wide range of interests represented in 
these struggles, Harvey argues that they produced a ‘less focused political dynamic of 
social action’ (Spronk and Webber, 2007: 32).  
Despite these limitations, Harvey argues that movements to ‘reclaim the 
commons’ had revolutionary potential (Spronk and Webber, 2007: 33). With the onset of 
the neoliberal era, privatization had become a crucial strategy of accumulation by 
dispossession involving the transfer of control of a previously state-owned enterprise to a 
transnational corporation (Spronk and Webber, 2007: 32). Privatization is defined as the 
transfer of control over a set of assets previously owned by the state to a private company 
at a very low cost. The last stage of accumulation by dispossession began with a 
neoliberal ideology that redefined the role of the state under the control of the American 
state, the IMF and the World Bank (Spronk and Webber, 2007: 32).  
The commons view of water emphasizes its unique characteristics as a resource 
essential for life and ecosystem health and is directly connected to communities and 
ecosystems through the hydrological cycle (Bakker, 2007: 441). Jonathan Rowe defines 
the commons as “the vast realm that lies outside of both the economic market and the 
institutional state, and that all of us typically use without price. The atmosphere and 
oceans, languages and cultures, the stores of human knowledge and wisdom, the informal 
systems of community, the peace and quiet we crave, the genetic building blocks of life, 
are all aspects of the commons” (Barlow, 2013: 68).  
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According to Richard Blocking, there are two types of commons. One type is a 
global commons including oceans, the atmosphere and outer space, while others, such as 
community spaces, common land, forests, and local medicines, are community commons 
(Barlow, 2013: 69). According to Barlow (2013: 69), there are three types of commons: 
the water, air, fisheries and forests of which human lives depend on, collective culture 
and knowledge, and the social commons guaranteeing access to basic healthcare, 
education and social programs such as pensions and welfare.  
In recent decades, domestic corporations began expanding to other countries to 
take advantage of cheap labour, weak environmental regulations, and natural resources 
(Barlow, 2013: 71). Corporations began to gain access to the seeds, timber, minerals and 
water resources of extremely isolated regions. Access to the commons by transnational 
corporations became ‘protected’ by trade agreements, giving corporations the right to sue 
governments if their access was restricted (Barlow, 2013: 71). Corporations view water as 
an economic good that can be bought and sold instead of a community resource to be 
protected under the public trust doctrine (Barlow, 2013: 75).  
The doctrine of public trust is the method to protect the commons from 
encroachment (Barlow, 2013: 70). The commons must be protected for the common good 
and must not be used for private profit. Under the public trust doctrine, all levels of 
government are required to act as trustees to protect these resources and to fulfill the 
financial responsibility to sustain them (Barlow, 2013: 70). This doctrine was challenged 
by the increase of private rights to water. Starting in the 1970s, for example, the health of 
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the commons began to be challenged by processes of economic globalization (Barlow, 
2013: 71).  
According to Vandana Shiva, the enclosure of the water commons occurred 
through dams, groundwater mining and privatization (Barlow, 2013: 72). The principle of 
private ownership as practiced by transnational corporations was unfamiliar to the 
majority of the world’s rural, peasant and indigenous communities (Barlow, 2013: 72). 
Traditional societies did not understand their resources as having an economic value. 
Instead, according to Shiva, they viewed their resources in terms of community benefits, 
therefore emphasizing relationships over economic gain (Barlow, 2013: 72).  
Beginning in the 1970s, governments from mostly wealthy countries began 
supporting private ownership of water and other commons (Barlow, 2013: 73). As 
governments eliminated social security systems, corporate values replaced the values of 
the commons such as collective ownership and inclusion. Many services once considered 
outside of market control became an opportunity for profit (Barlow, 2013: 74). 
Governments and companies began to attempt to profit from the land, genetic, mineral, 
forest and water resources of the commons, transferring hundreds of billions of dollars 
away from public social services. Enclosure of the commons can threaten the health of 
the environment by valuing profit over sustainability and can impose market values in 
areas that should be free from commodification (Barlow, 2013: 74). 
According to Barlow and Clarke (2002: 104), the responsibility of providing 
quality and consistent water services shifted from governments to transnational 
corporations. The authors claim that despite the intentions of corporations, private 
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businesses are not designed to meet the needs of the public, but to obtain profit. As 
governments abandoned their responsibility to protect their country’s water commons, 
transnational water corporations like Suez began taking on this responsibility (Barlow and 
Clarke, 2002: 104). In the early 2000s, provision of water services started to become a 
significant business investment, supported by global water markets, making water ‘an 
industry for the 21st century’ (Barlow and Clarke, 2002: 104).  
 Starting in the 21st century, the global water industry began to experience significant 
growth (Barlow and Clarke, 2002: 109). Shareholders demanded increasing profits, 
encouraging water corporations to continually grow and obtain profits. This encouraged 
major water corporations to expand marketing internationally and to obtain more 
companies (Barlow and Clarke, 2002: 109). Secondly, water corporations were motivated 
to expand because of the World Bank’s policy of encouraging partnerships with other 
companies. Finally, water corporations were motivated to expand because of their broad 
relationships with governments, banks, IFIs and political parties (Barlow and Clarke, 
2002: 109).  
According to Jeffrey Webber, fifteen years of neoliberal economic restructuring 
from 1985-2000 in Bolivia resulted in the dominance of elitist ‘pacted’ democracy and 
the deconstruction of popular movements (Webber, 2009a: 2). Left-indigenous struggle in 
Bolivia was reawakened with the Cochabamba water war in 2000 against the World Bank 
enforced privatization of the Cochabamba municipal water utility. Webber argues that 
this uprising initiated a five-year protest cycle within urban and rural populations, the 
indigenous majority and other populations (Webber, 2009a: 2). The social movements 
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from 2000-2005 in Bolivia resulted in the removal of two neoliberal presidents, Gonzalo 
Sanchez de Lozada in 2003 and Carlos Gisbert Mesa in 2005 (Webber, 2009a: 3). During 
this protest cycle, state violence was not sufficient to reduce the power of the social 
movements and instead delegitimized neoliberal economic policies and radicalized 
movement demands (Webber, 2009a: 3).  
Many authors state that movement leaders mobilized diverse populations such as 
workers, peasants, children, the elderly, politicians, business people, labour leaders, 
women and middle class citizens (Olivera et al, 2004: 34, Shultz, 2009: 17 and McNeish, 
2006: 232). Thomas Perreault (2006: 166), however, emphasizes the exclusionary nature 
of the water war protests. The author explains that the irrigators maintained their 
influence in a way that hurt the needs of urban migrant populations that had inconsistent 
water access. The Cochabamba Peasant Irrigators’ Federation (FEDECOR) was 
composed primarily of irrigators in the lower and central valleys of Cochabamba who had 
access to high quality land, urban markets and personal wells (Perreault, 2006: 166). 
Perreault (2009: 166) states that through the water war, FEDECOR solidified its political 
capacity and maintained its political and social influence to guarantee success. As a 
result, the benefits of the achievements were distributed unequally throughout Bolivia’s 
peasant populations (Perreault, 2006: 167).  
The central concern of movement leaders and participants was the extreme price 
hikes following SEMAPA’s privatization (Bakker, 2008: 237). Two months following the 
sale of SEMAPA to Aguas del Tunari, rates were raised by as much as two hundred 
percent without service improvements, which ultimately cut off access to water for 
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working class and poor populations. Working class and poor Bolivian citizens no longer 
had access to a natural resource central to human survival (Bakker, 2008: 237). 
Additionally, Webber (2009a: 182) notes the centrality of cultural traditions and 
customary water uses within the water war protests. Webber (2009a: 182) states that the 
water wars were considered an anti-neoliberal social movement in which indigenous 
protest participants emphasized the importance of usos y costumbres, or cultural traditions 
regarding the use of commonly held water dating back centuries for Quechua indigenous 
communities.  
Similarly, Oscar Olivera (2004: 8) states that in Bolivia, people understood water 
as a sacred entity, and believed their right to water should not be sold. For rural people, 
this right was connected to traditional beliefs and customs dating to the times of the Incas 
(Olivera et al, 2004: 8). In addition to the central concerns over extreme price increases, 
the widespread idea that entire communities were to benefit from water access and that it 
should never be used for private profit were popular within the movement (Olivera et al, 
2004: 8). Perreault (2008: 835) also explains how leaders of FEDECOR centred the 
conflict on traditional and customary water uses. The irrigators believed that the water 
war victory represented the protection of their traditional and customary water uses that 
were considered to be threatened by neoliberal government policies (Perreault, 2008: 
835).  
In addition, the extreme price hikes that ultimately cut off water access for poorer 
populations led to the centrality of the ideas of water as a human right and as necessary 
for survival within the movement. Participants in the movement emphasized the centrality 
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of water to basic human survival and to the health of individuals and communities as 
articulated by the slogan, “to privatize water is to privatize life itself” (Webber, 2009a: 
183). Importantly, water scarcity and the price increases that came with privatization were 
fundamental concerns of the protesters and impacted the majority of the Cochabamba 
population negatively (Webber, 2009a: 183). In contrast to other natural resources, water 
is necessary for human survival and is crucial to the sustainability of communities and 
countries (Perreault, 2005: 269). Cochabamba is located within a dry and fertile valley 
with great competition over water for domestic and productive uses. Due to water scarcity 
and its necessity for human survival, water was one of the significant political issues in 
the city (Spronk, 2007: 15).  
Webber (2009a: 183) emphasizes the macro-focus of the protests and that the 
dominant role of IFIs and multinational corporations enabled the reemergence of the 
Bolivian tradition of anti-imperialism and a challenge to macro-foundations of power, 
hegemony and inequality. The development of feelings of solidarity, of an oppositional 
consciousness and of a greater knowledge of the influence of mass protest led to the 
radicalization of protest demands between 2000 and 2005 (Webber, 2009a: 183). Webber 
(2009a: 183) claims that the victory represented the first victory of left-indigenous social 
movements after fifteen years of the dominance of neoliberal policies in Bolivia. The 
indigenous and working classes were understood to have won a struggle against the 
Bolivian ruling class, the neoliberal government, the IMF and the World Bank, and the 
transnational water corporation owned by the American company Bechtel (Webber, 
2009a: 183). 
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In contrast, Spronk and Webber (2007: 33) argue that the protests during the gas 
wars produced a more macro-focus and represented a more significant challenge to 
neoliberal expansion in Bolivia than the water war. The gas wars represented a struggle 
against the privatization of the hydrocarbon sector in Bolivia. The authors explain how 
the gas wars of September-October 2003 represented the rising of indigenous radicalism 
and an exposure of the oppressive nature of the Bolivian state (Spronk and Webber, 2007: 
35). The struggle shifted from El Alto (the suburb surrounding the capital city) to La Paz 
with neighbourhoods and middle-class residents joining the movement. On October 17, 
2003, more than 50,000 people took to the streets, forcing neoliberal president Sanchez de 
Lozada and his supporters to flee the country. Under Sanchez de Lozada, more than 80 
people were killed in September-October 2003 and approximately 80 people suffered gun 
wounds (Sponk and Webber, 2007: 36).  
 Given the perceived lesser importance of water as an economic good by the 
Bolivian government, Spronk and Webber (2007: 42) argue that the water war protests 
produced a micro-focus and were not concerned with challenging macro-foundations of 
power and inequality. Despite successfully blocking the privatization, activists learned 
that expelling foreign corporations and altering national water laws were small steps in 
controlling and reforming the national water system and many protesters felt that 
achieving control of the local water system did not significantly impact their lives, 
symbolizing the narrow focus of the protests (Spronk and Webber, 2007: 41-43).  
Webber argues that the water war protests attempted to reform unequal power 
structures and to overcome political and social inequality and oppression. According to 
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Webber, the left-indigenous movement from 2000 and 2005 represented struggles for 
liberation in addition to overcoming racial oppression and class exploitation (Webber, 
2011: 49).  Most significantly, beginning with the water war, the popular movements put 
forward the idea of a revolutionary Constituent Assembly that would transform the 
Bolivian state and society, greater serve the poor indigenous majority and overcome 
racial and class exploitation through direct political participation and democracy 
(Webber, 2011: 4). However, the assembly that was actually introduced by the 2006 
Morales government ignored all revolutionary and participatory aspects of the assembly. 
In contrast, to appeal to the elites of the Santa Cruz region, the assembly that was 
introduced by the government was similar to the structure of the congress (Webber, 2011: 
4). 
Similarly to efforts to enhance democracy, Olivera (2004: 8-15) states that the 
Bolivian political system needed to be reformed to include collective discussion, 
decision-making and implementation to solve common problems. The need for political 
reform resulted from the repressive policies of IFIs and the IDB that impacted the actions 
of the Bolivian government and led to the spread of social activism (Olivera et al, 2004: 
8-15, Kohl, 2006: 305 and Perreault, 2006: 156). 
 In addition to Olivera’s connection with the policies of IFIs, Benjamin Kohl 
connects anti-privatization protests and neoliberalism in Bolivia to systems of hegemony 
resulting from “transnational political networks that seek to sustain, regulate and rule an 
increasingly global capitalist order” (Kohl, 2006: 308). Kohl also draws on Antonio 
Gramsci’s definition of hegemony involving elites using civil institutions to obtain 
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consent for their policies through ‘intellectual and moral direction’ based on force and 
coercion (Kohl, 2008: 309). Similarly to the argument that elites sustain hegemonic 
systems, Brent Kaup argues that radical shifts toward and away from neoliberal policies 
in Bolivia were shaped by conflicts between transnational and local actors and by 
conflicts between competing domestic elites (Kaup, 2012: 2). According to Kohl, 
hegemony encompasses actions and policies of civil society, the state and domestic and 
international elites (Kohl, 2008: 309). 
 Many authors agree that transnational actors and domestic and international elites 
exercised significant control over the political and economic affairs of Bolivia without the 
full and informed consent of the people, therefore dispossessing them of their natural 
resources (Kaup, 2012: 98 and Spronk and Webber, 2006: 32). In relation to Olivera’s 
central claim, John-Andrew McNeish (2006: 220) argues that protests in Bolivia since 
1985 were linked to failures to improve democratic participation that were rooted in 
prejudicial international and national policy. Also, Moises Arce and Roberta Rice (2009: 
88) maintain that the 2000-2005 round of protests were based on the idea that legislative 
and executive branches of the government could no longer be the sole decision-making 
bodies and instead, decision-making must occur with active societal discussion (Arce and 
Rice, 2009: 88). These arguments are related to Olivera’s (2004: 8-15) claim that political 






In conclusion, the Cochabamba water war was an example of an anti-neoliberal and anti-
imperialist social movement protesting the privatization of the city’s water commons 
(Spronk and Webber, 2007: 32 and Webber, 2009a: 183). The movements that emerged 
in Bolivia to protest the privatization of water and gas challenged what Harvey calls 
‘accumulation by dispossession’ through ‘enclosing the commons’ (Spronk and Webber, 
2007: 32). According to Harvey, violent capital accumulation led to a variety of social 
struggles under a broad section of civil society, producing movements with a “less 
focused political dynamic of social action” (Spronk and Webber, 2007: 32).  
In addition, Webber (2009a: 183) emphasizes the anti-neoliberal and anti-
imperialist nature of the protests. According to the author, the water war victory 
represented the first victory for Bolivian citizens against neoliberalism since 1985 
(Webber, 2009a: 183). Because of the movement’s strong social base, indigenous and 
working classes were understood to have won a struggle against the country’s ruling 
class, the neoliberal government, the IMF, the World Bank and the transnational water 
corporation owned by the American company Bechtel (Webber, 2009a: 183). 
The privatization of water was an extreme application of the neoliberal policy of 
privatization because unlike other natural resources, water is crucial for human and 
environmental survival (Webber, 2009a: 183). In addition to protesting higher user fees, 
the idea of access to water as a human right and as central to human survival was critical 
during the water war protests and contributed to the movement’s victory (Webber, 2009a: 
183). Due to water scarcity in Cochabamba and the importance of water access, water 
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was one of the most politically contentious issues in the area, which enabled protest 
leaders to gain support from diverse social classes, occupations and cultural groups 
(Webber, 2009a: 183). 
The movement was successful because its leaders effectively mobilized diverse 
populations of workers, peasants, children, the elderly, politicians, business people, 
labour leaders, women and middle class citizens (Olivera et al, 2004: 34, Shultz, 2009: 17 
and McNeish, 2006: 232). Significantly, indigenous organizers transformed the 
movement from a local protest to a broad social movement. Leaders connected the 
privatization of water to the traditional and customary water uses of indigenous 
communities (Webber, 2009a: 182). The privatization of the water system was considered 
an assault on these customary uses and on the role of indigenous peoples as guardians of 
nature, as water was understood to be a sacred entity by indigenous peoples (Olivera et al, 
2004: 8). The Coordinadora based its actions on the higher user fees in addition to the 
indigenous beliefs that water was a collective right, that entire communities were to 
benefit from water access and that it could not be sold for private profit (Ochoa et al, 
2009: 74).  
The 2000 water war movement was a different process than previous anti-
neoliberal social movements in Latin America during the 1980s and 1990s (Olivera et al, 
2004: 28). The movement generated strong forces of resistance in urban and rural areas to 
protest the privatization of water, a resource necessary for human life, and more 
generally, the imposition of capitalism and neoliberal policies (Olivera et al, 2004: 28). 
The movement resulted in a struggle between a strong community coalition and 
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government forces, which eventually forced the Bolivian government to reverse its 





















The Context:  





A variety of social movements emerged in response to the negative effects of neoliberal 
policies in Bolivia (Goldstein, 2005: 396). Specifically, in response to the privatization 
pillar of the neoliberal model, a broad-based social movement emerged in Cochabamba to 
protest the privatization of SEMAPA, the municipal water system. Led by a coordinating 
group (‘la Coordinadora’), the social movement was successful in ejecting Aguas del 
Tunari, partially owned by Bechtel, from Bolivia  (Olivera et al, 2004: 8).  
      The purpose of this chapter is to establish the historical context of the neoliberal 
model in Bolivia and the social movement that mobilized forces of popular resistance to it 
in Cochabamba. The chapter will be divided into four sections as follows:  
 
1. Global expansion of the neoliberal model  
 During the 1980s and 1990s, the neoliberal model achieved global hegemony with 
the emergence of a ‘new world order’ following the collapse of socialism in the former 
USSR and in Eastern Europe (Veltmeyer, 1997: 207). A major outcome of the new world 
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order emerging in Latin America was the strengthening of policy frameworks that 
focused on market-oriented economic reforms. These reforms included trade and capital 
liberalization, deregulation, privatization and the expansion of the mobility of capital in 
the form of foreign direct investment (FDI) (Veltmeyer, 1997: 208). The ‘structural 
adjustment program’ (SAP) of the World Bank and the IMF and the macroeconomic 
reforms (privatization, liberalization, deregulation) mandated by the Washington 
Consensus resulted in a massive inflow of FDI into Latin America in the 1990s. Table 1.1 
captures some of the dynamics of these massive capital inflows and associated outflows 
in the form of FDI.  
 
Table 1 Long-term north-south capital flows, 1985–2001  
(US$ billion) 
 
1985–89  1990–94  1995–99  2000–01 
 
Official (foreign aid) 
200.0  274.6  230.1   74.1 
 
Private capital  
 157.0  552.5  1,240.4  386.8 
 FDI  76.0  268.5  772.8  334.9 
 Portfolio investments  6.0  111.5  165.6  69.4 
 Other  75.0  172.5  302.0  −18.5 
 
Net resource inflow 357.0 827.1 1,470.8 440.9 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Sources: Petras & Veltmeyer, 2013: 31; based on data in IMF (2000) and World Bank (2002). 
 
Latin America experienced the first major wave of FDI during the 1960s and 
1970s, but the imperialist nature behind this policy was restricted by the role of the 
developmental state (Veltmeyer, 2012: 63). To free market structures from the apparent 
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restrictions of the developmental state, the IMF and the World Bank designed a set of 
macroeconomic policy reforms that were imposed as a response to the Latin American 
debt crisis (Veltmeyer, 2012: 63). These policies encouraged a new form of capital inflow 
into Latin America during the 1980s. In the 1970s, the region experienced a massive 
inflow of capital in the form of loans, and in the 1980s, a massive outflow of capital as 
debt repayments (Veltmeyer, 2012: 63).  
In the 1990s, Latin American countries experienced a major capital inflow 
encouraged by the macroeconomic reforms imposed by the IMF and the World Bank 
(Veltmeyer, 2012: 63). In response to these reforms, multinational corporations (MNCs) 
increased their investment in the region from $8.7 billion in 1990 to $61 billion in 1998. 
During this period, forty-three percent of FDI from the US to developing countries was 
sent to Latin America (Veltmeyer, 2012: 63).   
 
2. The expansion of neoliberalism in Latin America 
      Following the introduction of neoliberal policies in the region in the 1970s and 
1980s, Latin American governments attempted to reduce social spending to encourage the 
free flow of the market. Governments reduced social spending by privatizing previously 
state-owned enterprises to reduce the countries’ debt burden and to secure future 





3. Neoliberalism in Bolivia 
The Bolivian neoliberal project was constructed by a small group of elites who 
supported Hugo Banzer’s presidential campaign. In 1985, Banzer put together a small 
group of economists to construct an economic plan (Conagan et al, 1990: 13). The state 
restricted government participation in the economy by privatizing many state-owned 
enterprises, enhancing the influence of the private sector and encouraging self-
employment among workers displaced by the privatization policy (Goldstein, 2005: 396). 
 
4. Responses to neoliberalism in Bolivia: The Cochabamba Water War 
The popular response to the government’s neoliberal policy agenda regarding the 
privatization of water—the mobilization of resistance in the form of a powerful social 
movement—can be analyzed in two ways: (i) the conditions leading up to the movement; 
and (ii) the actual dynamics of the social movement. 
 
(i)  Conditions leading up to the movement 
In Bolivia, the World Bank was primarily responsible for attempts to privatize the 
Cochabamba municipal water company. In the mid-1990s, the World Bank gave the 
Bolivian government a loan to improve its public water systems and to encourage private 
investment, making privatization a requirement to continue receiving loans (Spronk & 
Webber, 2007: 39). Two months following the sale of SEMAPA, rates were raised by 
almost two hundred percent without service improvements (Bakker, 2008: 239). The 
higher fees eventually triggered the movement that succeeded in ejecting Aguas del 
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Tunari from Bolivia and in reversing the privatization contract (Spronk and Webber, 
2007: 39). 
 
(ii)  The water war movement   
      Under the leadership of Oscar Olivera, the Coordinadora successfully mobilized 
diverse populations such as children, environmentalists, teachers, business people and 
activists and held collective citywide meetings to portray the needs of the collective group 
(Olivera et al, 2004: 56-57). The Coordinadora used unique protest strategies, such as a 
holding its own referendum to ask citizens their opinions on water privatization. Despite 
the overwhelming support for the movement, the government did not act on the results of 
the referendum (Olivera et al, 2004: 36). 
 
Global expansion of neoliberal governance 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the neoliberal model obtained significant global influence 
(Gwynne and Kay, 2000: 142). This period saw the collapse of Soviet Russia and the 
state-led economic model. The introduction of neoliberal reforms in certain parts of 
Europe and the smooth transition from state to market-led economies gave Latin 
American governments incentives to adopt these programs. Latin American politicians 
understood that neoliberal principles were the basis of competitive industrial economies 
around the world (Gwynne and Kay: 142). According to Latin American treasury 
ministers, it became necessary for economies to modernize to become more competitive 
in the global capitalist market. Economic modernization was considered necessary for 
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governments to attract foreign investment from transnational corporations that had 
various investment options across the continent (Gwynne and Kay, 2000: 142).  
 
The expansion of neoliberalism in Latin America 
Following the introduction of neoliberal policies, national governments in Latin America 
attempted to reduce their commitments to social welfare programs to enable the free flow 
of the market (Gwynne & Kay, 2000: 150). Governments reduced social spending 
through privatizing various sectors of society such as pension reform and social 
programs, reducing government debt burden and encouraging private investment 
(Gwynne & Kay, 2000: 150). The private sector was also encouraged to invest in 
education and health care, often resulting in two-tiered systems that allowed access to the 
middle and upper classes while the poor populations were left without sufficient 
government assistance in a low quality and underfunded public service (Gwynne & Kay, 
2000: 150). As a result of the decrease in state social spending, nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) increased their role in the provision of basic services in urban and 
rural areas (Gwynne & Kay, 2000: 150).  
 In the region, social spending dropped by twenty-four percent in the 1980s, and 
the quality and level of social services declined, even in countries with the most effective 
systems. During the 1980s, average per capita income in the region “fell by 11 percent, 
real wages declined substantially and there was a sharp increase in unemployment or 
underemployment” (Nilsson & Gustafsson, 2012:121). Most new jobs that were created 
were in the informal sector, in which low wages and poor working conditions were 
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common. The size of the informal sector in Latin America in relation to formal 
employment increased from 25.6 percent in 1980 to 31.9 percent in the 1990s, when 
seven of every ten jobs were generated in the informal sector (Nillson & Gustafsson, 
2012: 122).  
 
Neoliberalism in Bolivia 
In the 1980s within the context of an expanding debt crisis in the region, the Bolivian 
state followed the demands of international lending agencies and lender nations and 
adopted neoliberal policies and economic reforms (Goldstein, 2005: 396). Under the 
control of the World Bank and the IMF, whose policies were represented by Jeffery 
Sachs, a Cambridge economist invited to construct a policy response to Bolivia’s 
inflation, a policy termed ‘shock therapy,’ the economy was restructured to encourage 
multinational investment, the privatization of previously state-owned enterprises and a 
diminishing of welfare state public spending and social programs (Wilson, 2014: 16: 20-
40). 
These policies brought unemployment and an increase in poverty for the majority 
of the population. Diverse attempts by the government to implement these policy 
measures and to advance its neoliberal agenda over the 1990s were met with protest and 
an uprising of the population entailing considerable state violence, as shown in the gas 
wars of 2003 and 2005 (Goldstein, 2005: 396). As the water and  gas wars illustrate, 
protesters understood their poverty had its origins in the oppression integrated within 
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transnational capitalism, and that privatization and open markets had negative impacts on 
their standards of living and quality of life (Goldstein, 2005: 405).  
      In Bolivia, the neoliberalism project was developed by an elite group that 
supported Hugo Banzer’s presidential campaign within the ruling class (Conagan et al, 
1990: 13). In early 1985, Banzer put together a small group of economic advisors to help 
him develop an economic plan and the group was considered an informal advisory 
committee to the president. The committee had served with the previous Banzer 
government and had positions within the Accion Democratica Nacionalista (ADN) 
political party (Conagan et al, 1990: 13). Ronald Maclean, an ADN politician and 
Kennedy School graduate, suggested that the specifics of Bolivia’s neoliberal program be 
developed in cooperation with economists at Harvard University. In the spring of 1985, 
Banzer and his administration travelled to Cambridge, Massachusetts for a seminar on the 
Bolivian economy and Sachs became the advisor to this team of Bolivian politicians 
(Conagan et al, 1990: 13).  
      Bolivia had one of the most aggressive neoliberal models in Latin America. Since 
1985, the Bolivian state favoured policies that restricted the direct participation of the 
state in the economy, that enhanced the influence of the private sector, and that promoted 
the self-employment of displaced workers (Goldstein, 2005: 396). As of 2005, all 
previously publicly owned industries had been privatized, the political influence of trade 
unions had declined, jobs and state programs were cut, and previous responsibilities of 
the state concerning economic and social development were transferred to the private 
sector or to NGOs (Goldstein, 2005: 396).  
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 Privatization in Bolivia had been a controversial issue since the development of 
the country’s first World Bank SAP in 1985 (Kohl, 2004: 894). In 1985, the IMF 
stabilization plan led the Paz Estenssoro (1985-90) government to institute the New 
Economic Plan (NEP), which reduced government spending and enforced a strict 
economic policy meant to control hyperinflation (Kohl, 2004: 896). The NEP resulted in 
the closing of numerous state owned mines and the firing of 25,000 miners. The mines 
had been nationalized in 1952 and were a crucial institution for labour organizing and 
were the origin of anti-neoliberal protests in Bolivia (Kohl, 2004: 894).  
      The destruction of mining unions had significant impacts on social movement 
organizing in Bolivia (Kohl, 2004: 894). Kohl maintains that the Bolivian model of 
privatization reduced the government’s ability to design sustainable economic policy and 
resulted in increased political instability. As a result, social organizing and public protests 
increased as large portions of the population protested against the government’s economic 
restructuring. However, traditional social movements were not able to reduce private 
sector influence in the mining industry (Kohl, 2004: 894). 
In 1992, President Paz Zamora passed the Law of Privatization, allowing the sale 
of thirty small state firms to private companies (Kohl, 2004: 897). Despite this law, the 
World Bank and other international institutions continued to encourage large-scale 
privatization measures. During his 1993 presidential campaign, Sanchez de Lozada, 
Planning Minister in Zamora’s government, proposed the partial sale of the six largest 
state owned firms in Bolivia, in which the government would obtain a fifty-one percent 
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share of the firms and distribute them to Bolivian citizens over the age of twenty-one 
(Kohl, 2004: 897).   
The 1993 Plan de Todos attempted to bring together demands for greater regional 
autonomy and economic liberalization by increasing private sector participation in certain 
industries and restricting state involvement in the same sectors (Perreault, 2006: 156). 
This resulted in transnational corporations gaining almost unrestricted access to the 
country’s natural resources. State restructuring under the Plan de Todos led to the re-
scaling of the national economy and to the shifting of control over natural resources from 
the state to largely foreign and private control (Perreault, 2006: 156).  
The Law of Capitalization was signed in March 1994 with little Congressional 
debate, and led to the sale of the federal oil and gas, telecommunications, airline, power 
and railroad companies (Kohl, 2004: 898). This law established guidelines on how best to 
distribute profits garnered from privatizing previously state owned enterprises. As the 
contracts for this sale gave the government forty-nine percent of the shares of the 
privatized companies, they were unable to use the extra profit to reduce the national 
deficit, similarly to efforts in Mexico and Brazil (Kohl, 2004: 898). The law resulted in a 
variety of reactions across the political spectrum. The political left called the law 
unconstitutional and claimed the government had handed the country’s national wealth 
over to transnational companies unfairly, and the political right spoke against the sale of 
strategic industries (Kohl, 2004: 899). The military class was against the sale of the 
railroads to a Chilean company, claiming it was a national security threat. Additionally, 
economists on the right and left claimed that the law would lead to the loss of 12,000 jobs 
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and would reduce governmental ability to construct effective economic policy (Kohl, 
2004: 899). 
 
Responses to the neoliberal model in Bolivia: The Cochabamba Water War 
 
Conditions leading to the movement 
Protests against the sale of previously state-owned industries began before Sanchez de 
Lozada took office for the first time in 1993 (Kohl, 2004: 899). Public mobilizations 
primarily consisted of daily marches and demonstrations in La Paz and members of 
individual unions striking and protesting once their firms were sold to private companies. 
While protesters regularly took to the streets and clashed daily with riot police, constant 
mobilizations became a part of daily life in many Bolivian cities. However, these protests 
did not restrict the future sale of other industries to private companies and did not stop the 
mass layoffs that followed (Kohl, 2004: 899). 
      In Bolivia, the World Bank was primarily responsible for the attempts to privatize 
municipal water systems in Cochabamba and El Alto, La Paz. In the mid-1990s, the 
World Bank gave a loan to Bolivia to improve its public water systems and to encourage 
investment (Spronk and Webber, 2007: 39). The World Bank and the IDB made the 
privatization of SEMAPA a condition of continuing to receive loans, and recommended 
the elimination of controls over water prices (Olivera et al, 2004: 8). Generally, upper 
class Cochabamba citizens reacted modestly to the fee increases, while working class 
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people  could not afford the additional $30 monthly that came with the privatization 
(Olivera, et al, 2004: 8).  
      Two months after the sale of SEMAPA to Aguas del Tunari, rates were raised, in 
some cases by two hundred percent, without service improvements (Bakker, 2008:  239). 
Compared to the water company in El Alto, the Cochabamba system was not effective. 
Prior to the privatization of SEMAPA, Cochabamba citizens received water for 
approximately four hours a day and the system covered fifty-seven percent of the 
population (Spronk and Webber, 2007:39).  
 The contract awarded by the government to Aguas del Tunari encompassed 
expanding water production through the construction of a dam tunnel project that would 
cost approximately US $300 million. Additionally, the contract guaranteed the company a 
return of fifteen to seventeen percent over the forty years of the contract (Spronk and 
Webber, 2007: 39). Following the World Bank recommendation that dam construction 
must not be funded by the public sector, the most stable source of funding was the 
individual users. To pay for the project, the company increased water fees, triggering the 
Cochabamba water war of 2000, which eventually ejected Aguas del Tunari from Bolivia 
(Spronk and Webber, 2007: 39). 
      Near the end of 1999, the irrigators visited Oscar Olivera, a former shoe factory 
worker and president of the Cochabamba Federation of Factory Workers. In his office, 
farmers, factory workers, environmentalists and others discussed the government’s plan 
to transfer control of the water system to Aguas del Tunari and the possible implications 
of this action (Shultz, 2009: 17). At this meeting, they decided to form a city-wide 
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rebellion against this plan and formed an alliance, the Coordinadora por la Defensa del 
Agua y de la Vida (the Coordinadora) to do so. The Coordinadora was formed as a 
response to what was seen as a failure of local institutions to protect the wellbeing of 
community residents (Shultz, 2009: 17).  
 
The Cochabamba Water War social movement 
The anti-privatization movement that followed was successful in ejecting Aguas del 
Tunari from Bolivia (Olivera et al, 2004: 8). Beginning in April 2000, the movement 
effectively mobilized diverse populations and held collective, citywide meetings to 
accurately portray the goals and needs of the collective group (Olivera et al, 2004: 56-57). 
Thomas Kruse defines the Cochabamba water war as “an example of the tensions and 
conflicts that globalization provokes at local levels” (Nilsson & Gustafsson, 2012: 99). 
Prior to the attempted privatization of SEMAPA, water was not considered an important 
part of the private market, even though it had always been significant for personal and 
agricultural use (Nilsson & Gustafsson, 2012: 99). Founded by Oscar Olivera, the 
Coordinadora used unique protest methods such as holding their own referendum by 
placing ballot boxes in different areas of Cochabamba to ask citizens their opinions about 
the privatization of water (Nilsson & Gustafsson, 2012: 101).  
      A referendum against water privatization was organized in March 2000 and was 
the first in Bolivian history with over 50,000 people voting for or against the privatization 
of water (Olivera et al, 2004: 36). This process illustrated that the Bolivian people did not 
support Aguas del Tunari’s presence in the country and that Law 2029, which enabled the 
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privatization of water, had to be changed (ibid.). By the middle of March, however, it was 
clear that the government had no intention of acting on the results of the referendum. As a 
result, leaders decided to demand not only the revision of the contract, but also the 
ejection of Aguas del Tunari from Bolivia (ibid.).  
      Two months had passed and the government refused to act on the results of the 
referendum. What became known as the ‘last battle’ took place over eight days and 
included the blockading of the main highways and significant protests in the centre of the 
city (Olivera et al, 2004: 37). On the final day of the protests, the movement mobilized 
100,000 people and eventually succeeded in ejecting the company from Bolivia, in 
reversing the privatization contract and winning a drastic reform of Law 2029 (ibid.).  
 
Implications of neoliberalism in Bolivia 
The success of neoliberalism in Bolivia was dependent on stimulating foreign investment, 
and predominately benefited economic elites. Bolivian legislation made it easier for 
employers to dismiss workers without reason and led to massive un- and under-
employment, primarily in the mining sector (Sanabria, 1999: 538). Neoliberalism in 
Bolivia, similarly to results across Latin America, led to the exploitation of non-
renewable resources, environmental degradation, and rising poverty levels. Miners, urban 
workers and peasants had unsuccessfully resisted mass firings, wage freezes, and 
increasing prices on consumer goods (Sanabria, 1999: 539).  
The implementation of neoliberal policies had drastic consequences for the 
country’s previously most powerful social actor, the Bolivian Workers’ Central (COB), a 
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confederation of Bolivian trade unions (Arce and Rice, 2009: 93). Economic restructuring 
weakened the position of organized labour within the national economy through 
privatizing state-owned industries, leading to massive job loss across various sectors. The 
decline of organized labour generated opportunities for new social actors including 
indigenous and rural landless groups and neighbourhood organizations (Arce & Rice, 
2009: 93).  
These groups, while lacking formal and legal representation, were at the forefront 
of anti-neoliberal protests in Bolivia. Although these groups were vulnerable to 
government attempts to weaken the social movements, the ability of movement 
organizers to connect the needs of diverse groups to a clear critique of government and 
international policies and to mobilize mass public actions were integral tools for the 
country’s anti-neoliberal social movements (Arce and Rice, 2009: 93).   
 
Conclusion 
Encouraged by the Cochabamba victory, indigenous and peasant groups from the 
highland regions led by Filipe Quispe and future president Evo Morales mobilized in 
September 2000 around a variety of issues, a period known as Black September (Arce & 
Rice, 2009: 92). As a result of the expansion of participation in popular protests, road 
blockades consisted of protesters physically occupying several miles of highway, making 
it more challenging for the military to remove the blockades. The September 2000 
protests concluded with the signing of a document constructed by protest leaders covering 
more than fifty points ranging from the adaptation of specific laws to the modification of 
  68 
infrastructure projects (ibid.).  According to Laserna (2002), results of the September 
2000 protests and other victories included an increasing frequency of street protests; more 
direct protests; and massive mobilizations based on the idea that those who did not 
participate would not have their voices taken into account (Arce & Rice, 2009, 92). 
      According to Webber (2009a: 2), the 2000 water war movement was significant 
because it initiated a five-year protest cycle within diverse populations. This cycle 
resulted in the removal of two neoliberal presidents: Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada in 2003 
and Carlos Gisbert Mesa in 2005, and led to the election of an indigenous and socialist 
president, Evo Morales (Webber, 2009a: 2). The water war was a crucial social 
movement because it represented the first victory for the Bolivian people against fifteen 
years of neoliberal dominance. The achievements of the movement symbolized a victory 
for indigenous peoples against the Bolivian ruling class, the neoliberal government, IFIs, 











The Cochabamba Water War:  
Outcomes of the Resistance 
 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the immediate outcomes of the water war, a multi-based social 
movement that emerged in Cochabamba, Bolivia, to protest the privatization of 
SEMAPA, the Cochabamba municipal water system. It examines the movement’s 
outcomes between the years 2000 and 2006. It questions whether the movement was 
successful in achieving its broader goals, for example, transforming the Bolivian political 
landscape (Olivera et al, 2004: 8). 
The chapter will be divided into five parts: (i) local political impacts; (ii) impacts 
on national and global policy; (iii) increased focus on water issues; (iv) inspiration 
provided for other social movements; and (v) the restructuring of labour unions related to 
the social movement formed in the struggle over water. 
 
Local political impacts 
At the local level, the Coordinadora failed to radically democratize SEMAPA and did not 
achieve its goals of increased efficiency and transparency, democratic decision-making, 
and universal access in the provision of water services (Bakker, 2008: 239). Following 
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the water war, approximately forty percent of the population did not have access to water 
and had to rely on unsafe and expensive water sold privately (Perrault, 2006: 159). 
 
Impacts on national and global policy  
In the past, Bolivian governments were required to share power with the military. After 
April 2000, however, weak governments were forced to cooperate with strong and 
influential social movements (Shultz, 2009: 29). The most obvious national impact of the 
movement was the election of Evo Morales as president as the leader of the MAS 
(Movement Towards Socialism) Party. Morales’s platform directly challenged the 
Washington Consensus and voting for him became a symbol of solidarity for those 
involved in the Cochabamba struggle (Shultz, 2009: 29). 
 
Increased attention towards water issues 
Following the Cochabamba water war, new pressure was placed on the government to 
create a transparent and participatory model of water governance. Civil society network, 
Mesa Técnica del Agua, had the idea to create a transparent forum concerned with water 
management encompassing civil society, state and market actors (Boelens, Getches & 
Guevara-Gill, 2010: 288). 
 
Inspiration provided to other social movements 
The water war victory was an inspiration to other social movements in Latin America and 
globally. Three and a half years after the water war, Bolivia experienced another powerful 
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anti-privatization movement protesting the plan allowing the export of natural gas 
through a Chilean port and that privatized the hydrocarbon sector (Perreault, 2008: 247). 
In addition, a similar movement emerged in Peru in March 2005 to protest the 
privatization of the local water utility, SEDAM-Huancayo (Spronk, 2009: 169). 
 
Restructuring of labour unions 
The victory led to the restructuring of union leadership and labour relations in the 
country. Following the movement, Coordinadora representatives introduced radical 
proposals aiming to democratize and decentralize the public utility based on community 
and social control through direct public participation (Spronk, 2009: 168). 
 
Local political impacts 
On the national and international levels, the immediate outcomes of the Cochabamba 
water war were substantial (Spronk and Webber, 2007: 21). According to Oscar Olivera, 
the water war was more than a struggle over water and instead represented a struggle 
‘from below’ to create a new form of democracy. Following the water war, Olivera and 
the Coordinadora became important international figures in the global campaign for 
publicly owned water and successfully expanded the demands of the Coordinadora to the 
national and international levels (Spronk & Webber, 2007: 21).  
At the local level, however, the immediate outcomes of the resistance were less 
significant (Bakker, 2008: 239). The failure of the Coordinadora to radically democratize 
SEMAPA meant a failure to achieve its goals of increased efficiency and transparency, 
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democratic decision-making and universal access within the provision of water services. 
In 2006, connection rates were less than fifty percent, corruption, inefficiency and lack of 
resources continued to hinder the success of SEMAPA and efforts to expand access to 
rural areas were hindered by lack of capital (Bakker, 2008: 239 and Spronk & Webber, 
2007: 21). In addition, services for those already customers of SEMAPA did not improve 
and in many areas of the city, water was provided for only a few hours a day.  Five years 
after the water war, local activists connected to the Coordinadora acknowledged that 
drastically reforming the municipal company was more challenging than previously 
anticipated (Spronk & Webber, 2007: 21). Currently in Cochabamba, families outside  
SEMAPA’s current service area are required to pay five to ten times more for water 
services than wealthy families connected to the municipal system. However, for those 
connected to SEMAPA, water access is intermittent and the water is of inconsistent 
quality (Achtenberg, 2013). 
Under the influence of many neoliberal governments from April 2000 to 
December 2005, the Bolivian government put few monetary resources into the newly 
nationalized water utility. Under the Aguas del Tunari contract, all previous debt of 
SEMAPA was forgiven (Spronk & Webber, 2007: 21). However, following its 
nationalization, the company was responsible for fulfilling all the debts it had 
accumulated over the past thirty years, totaling approximately US $18 million (Spronk & 
Webber, 2007: 21). Other government institutions also demanded SEMAPA be 
responsible for the payment of back-debts to the Bolivian Internal Revenue Service and to 
the City of Cochabamba. In addition, Minister Mario Galindo threatened to make 
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Cochabamba residents pay US $25 million in damages to Tunari representatives in 
international courts (Spronk & Webber, 2007: 21).    
Immediately following the water war, Coordinadora leaders joined the interim 
board of directors and in April 2002, the first elections were held (Ochoa et al., 2009: 76). 
These elections were to encourage the participation of Cochabamba residents within 
SEMAPA by enabling them to elect local representatives and in the first election, 
residents elected a local pastor to be on the board. In addition, the Coordinadora created a 
support group with resident participation to determine how to restructure the management 
hierarchy to ensure greater public participation in SEMAPA (Ochoa et al., 2009: 76). 
Despite these reforms, significant public participation within the SEMAPA 
management structure was not achieved (Ochoa et al., 2009: 76). According to Shultz, 
less than four percent of eligible voters went to the polls to elect the first board of 
directors. This occurred because it was difficult for the general Cochabamba population 
to understand the technical and financial functioning of the company, making it 
challenging for them to exert social control over its actions and functioning (Ochoa et al, 
2009: 76). Importantly, the most significant barrier to the democratic reform of SEMAPA 
was the lack of local autonomy since the company was controlled by national and 
international regulations (Ochoa et al., 2009: 76).   
Immediately following the water war, approximately forty percent of the 
population did not have consistent access to quality water sources and were required to 
rely on expensive and unsafe water sold by private companies (Perrault, 2006: 159). It 
was quickly realized that the problems of SEMAPA were not easily fixed with the 
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expulsion of Aguas del Tunari from Bolivia. Importantly, as a result of the company’s 
poor credit ratings, efforts to expand the network were hindered because of the difficulty 
of receiving new loans (Spronk & Webber, 2007: 41).  
Over time, local activists learned that expelling the company and reforming water 
legislation was a small step in truly obtaining social control over the municipal water 
utility in an environment in which politicians and international institutions favoured the 
interests of corporations over the health of local populations (Spronk & Webber, 2007: 
41). There were a variety of opinions as to what caused the challenges faced by the 
movement to democratize SEMAPA such as: the mayor’s control over the company’s 
budget; the strict conditions placed on the loan from the IDB; a lack of finance; the lack 
of new water sources and, most importantly, the unresponsiveness of the company to the 
needs of residents of all classes, a characteristic of SEMAPA prior to the water war 
(Bakker, 2008: 239).  
The Coordinadora aimed to democratize SEMAPA by exerting significant social 
pressure ‘from below’ and within management hierarchies. The SEMAPA board of 
directors previously included businessmen and municipal politicians. However, as of 
2007, it included three locally elected leaders from different regions of Cochabamba  
(Spronk & Webber, 2007: 22). At the insistence of Olivera, the SEMAPA union was also 
granted a vote on the board. The inclusion of union leaders caused significant problems 
and led to accusations of corruption. Local activists believed that illegal activity took 
place with the explicit consent of SEMAPA workers higher up in the union hierarchy 
(Spronk & Webber, 2007: 22). There was a general relationship of mistrust between 
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union leadership and members of the Coordinadora making it challenging to protect 
workers’ interests in negotiations and to restructure the municipal water utility (Spronk & 
Webber, 2007: 23). Traditional mistrust of government advancing the interests of elites 
also hindered the democratic gains made by the victory during the water war (Bakker, 
2008: 239).    
 
Impacts on national and global policy 
The water war was considered an inspiration to other movements protesting the 
privatization of water in a variety of areas, for example in Atlanta (Georgia), India and 
Uruguay (Shultz, 2009: 28). According to influential Indian activist Vandana Shiva, the 
Bolivian water war “provides a political education for every community struggling to 
reclaim their common and public spaces in this age of corporate globalization” (Shultz, 
2009: 28). The water war victory also impacted global policy making. Following the 
expulsion of Aguas del Tunari, institutions such as the World Bank found themselves 
having to defend their policies of privatization. In 2000, World Bank President James 
Wolfensohn was directly questioned about the movement by journalists in Washington 
DC. He claimed that developing countries must apply “a proper system of charging” to 
ensure that poor populations did not waste water (Shultz, 2009: 28).  
The victory in the water war also had great influence on Bolivian politics. For 
approximately two decades, Bolivian politics were dominated by principles found in the 
Washington Consensus enforced by the World Bank and the IMF and supported by many 
Bolivian presidents (Shultz, 2009: 28). While in the past, Bolivian governments were 
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required to share power with the military, after April 2000, weak governments had to 
cooperate with social movements with increasing power and influence (Shultz, 2009: 29). 
The first explicit evidence of the movement’s impact on Bolivian politics came in 2002 
when social movement leader Evo Morales ran for president as the leader of the MAS 
(Movement Towards Socialism) party. Directly challenging the Washington Consensus 
was the most important part of his platform and voting for him became a symbol of 
solidarity for those involved in the Cochabamba water war movement (Shultz, 2009: 29).  
 Webber (2010: 51) investigates the substantial body of literature on the left-
indigenous protest cycle that took place between 2000 and 2005 that challenged Bolivia’s 
neoliberal hegemony and forced the resignation of two neoliberal presidents. Neoliberal 
president Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada was forced to resign on October 17, 2003 and 
President Carlos Mesa on June 6, 2005 as a result of hundreds of thousands of protesters 
taking over the streets of the Bolivian capital city La Paz (Webber, 2010: 52). Following 
the collapse of the Mesa government, elections were pushed forward to December 2005, 
in which the first indigenous president Evo Morales was elected under the Movement 
Towards Socialism (MAS) party (Webber, 2010: 52).  
In 2003, a plan by President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada to export Bolivian 
natural gas through Chile to the United States resulted in widespread public protests and 
mobilizations (Shultz, 2009: 29). Eventually these protests would force Sanchez de 
Lozada to resign and to set up national elections in December 2005, resulting in the 
election of Evo Morales as the country’s first indigenous president. Instead of allowing 
the World Bank and the IMF to control the Bolivian economy, Morales based his policies 
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on the elimination of colonialism and on returning control over natural resources to 
Bolivian citizens (Shultz, 2009: 29).  
 According to Webber (2011: 4), the water war social movement put forward the 
idea for a radical and participatory Constituent Assembly with the goal of transforming 
Bolivian economic relations, political structures and government in the interests of the 
poor indigenous majority. This idea encompassed the direct participation of main social 
movement organizations in the execution of the assembly (Webber, 2011: 4). The 
assembly was hoped to bring together “a new type of political action born out of civil 
society as a means to discuss and to decide collective matters” (Olivera et al, 2004: 136).  
 Olivera (2004: 136) states that the assembly should have been understood as a great 
sovereign meeting of citizen representatives elected by their “neighbourhood 
organizations, their urban and rural associations, their unions, their communes.” The 
assembly actually introduced in 2006 by the MAS government, however, ignored all 
revolutionary and participatory components of the previous vision. Instead, it was similar 
to the traditional structures of Congress as the MAS government attempted to appeal to 
the elites of the Santa Cruz region, making concessions regarding the rules governing the 
assembly’s conduct and content (Webber, 2011: 4).  
 
Increased attention on water issues 
Prior to the water war, Bolivia did not have a single coherent body of law regulating 
water use. Instead, water use was governed by a variety of national laws covering other 
sectors such as mining, agriculture, industry and sewerage (Perreault, 2005: 275). In 
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September 1999, the Hugo Banzer government implemented Law 2029 (Ley de Agua 
Potable) regulating water use. The law was supported by the World Bank and created a 
national-level Superintendent of Water and enabled the privatization and concessions of 
urban water supplies (Perreault, 2005: 275). The law also failed to encourage public 
participation and did not acknowledge traditional indigenous and campesino (peasant) 
water rights. Following the Cochabamba water war, the government passed Law 2066 in 
April 2000 superseding Law 2029. Under this law, privatization remained a possibility, 
but was not explicitly encouraged (Perreault, 2005: 275). 
Following the movement, new pressure was placed on the government to create a 
transparent and participatory model of water governance. Civil society network Mesa 
Tecnica del Agua created a transparent forum concerned with water management 
encompassing civil society, state and market actors (Boelens, Getches & Guevara-Gill, 
2010: 288). Immediately following the movement, the IDB supported this idea as the 
primary source of funding for sewerage, drinking water and irrigation services (Boelens 
et al., 2010: 289). The IDB used the creation of this forum as a condition for continued 
funding for irrigation and sanitation. Resulting from this support, the government created 
the Inter-Institutional Water Council (CONIAG), a multi stakeholder forum, involving 
representatives from NGOs, government, civil society organizations, the private sector, 
the irrigators’ movement and other social movements (Boelens et al., 2010: 289).   
For three days in July 2001, approximately one hundred representatives of 
smallholder irrigator associations met in the Bolivian city of Oruru (Perreault, 2005: 277). 
These irrigators were assisted by a variety of Bolivian intellectuals and non-governmental 
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organizations that received funding from international actors. These local and regional 
meetings of irrigator and campesino organizations focused on the politics of water 
management and brought attention to campesino and irrigator rights (Perreault, 2005: 
277). Irrigators felt that their lives were threatened by the privatization of water and other 
natural resources. During this meeting, irrigators and civil society allies sought to form a 
national level organization to protect themselves from these threats. The discussions were 
based on the contradictions of Bolivian water law and on the fact that peasant irrigators 
had no legal basis in which to claim their rights (Perreault, 2005: 277).   
In the Oruru meeting, irrigators expressed distrust of the government’s national 
Superintendent of Water and verbalized a need for traditional forms of water management 
(Perreault, 2005: 277). To achieve this model, irrigators knew they had to organize 
nationally for the first time. To replace the National Superintendent of Water, the 
irrigators proposed the creation of the Servicio Nacional de Aguas (National Water 
Service) encompassing state, civil society and irrigator representatives. The purpose was 
to coordinate water management and to resolve water-use conflicts between diverse 
sectors (Perreault, 2005: 277).  
In December 2002, the irrigators met again in Cochabamba and proposed the 
creation of the Comité Nacional de Regantes (National Irrigators’ Committee) to include 
two representatives from each sector in which irrigation was prominent (Perreault, 2005: 
277). These two national level organizations would, in theory, protect the customary uses 
of peasant irrigators from other sectorial interests. These efforts represented the first time 
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irrigators organized beyond the departmental level and symbolized an important struggle 
against the expansion of capitalist interests in Bolivia (Perreault, 2005: 277).  
  In November 2003, irrigators hosted the First National Irrigators’ Congress in 
Cochabamba. This was a major three-day event that brought together irrigators from 
across Bolivia (Perreault, 2005: 278). The first two days were comprised of debating 
proposals of previous meetings and developing the organization’s bylaws and structure. 
Once the irrigators reached consensus, they marched through the centre of Cochabamba 
and to the campus of the University of San Simon, one of the country’s biggest and oldest 
public institutions (Perreault, 2005: 277). Marchers filed into the university gymnasium, 
in which organizers, family members and supporters listened to speeches from 
government officials and movement leaders. The purpose of this gathering was to 
officially inaugurate the organization named the Asociacion Nacional de Regantes y de 
Sistemas Comunitarias de Agua Potable (National Association of Irrigators and of 
Community Drinking Water Systems) (Perreault, 2005: 277). 
 The inclusion of community drinking water systems in the title was significant 
because it signaled the movement’s attempts to challenge the government’s regulation of 
community water systems (Perreault, 2005: 278). In contrast, irrigators argued for more 
holistic and community-based forms of water management. While irrigation was the 
central concern for the organization, the focus was expanded to include diverse 
community-based drinking water systems. Following the inaugural congress, the 
irrigators finalized the organizations bylaws and statutes and with the help of 
representatives from two Bolivian NGOs, received legal status (Perreault, 2005: 278).  
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A central concern of the irrigators was the protection of their customary practices, 
or usos y costumbres. This concept provided a legal basis for water rights and was also a 
vital symbol for traditional, place-specific and culturally unique resource-use practices 
(Perreault, 2005: 278). Therefore, this concept was repeatedly emphasized in meetings, 
speeches and documents as necessary for protecting the water rights of peasant irrigators. 
This concept also illustrated how civil society actors attempted to restructure state 
arrangements and to challenge state institutions responsible for managing water rights 
(Perreault, 2005: 278). Rather than conforming to market logic, irrigators demanded a 
right to water based on their citizenship status and their cultural values and practices 
(Perreault, 2005: 278). 
Through their mobilizations, irrigators resisted the commodification of water 
management in favour of a form of decentralized management based on community 
participation and local cultural practices (Perreault, 2005: 279). Irrigators and supporters 
formed multi-level networks through organizing at the national level for the first time to 
claim their water rights. These networks were meant to challenge the power of domestic 
and transnational capital by developing new global and local relationships (Perreault, 
2005: 279). According to Perreault (2005: 281), although the irrigators were successful in 
forming a legally recognized national organization, their interests were frequently 
challenged by domestic and international elites determined to privatize Bolivia’s natural 




Inspiration for other movements 
 The water war social movement served as inspiration for other anti-privatization 
movements in Bolivia concerning water and natural gas, and in other Latin American 
countries. A similar anti-privatization movement emerged in Huancayo, Peru five years 
after the water war (Spronk, 2009: 169) In March 2005, a movement made up of a water 
workers’ union, market worker associations, and irrigation farmers opposed the 
privatization of the local water utility, SEDAM-Huancayo (Spronk, 2009: 169). The 
movement was eventually successful on March 30, 2005 with a citywide strike of more 
than 15,000 people pressuring the government to reverse its plans for privatization. The 
public sector trade union, the Single Union of Potable Workers of Huancayo, played a 
crucial role in the movement by actively seeking to sustain diverse coalitions (Spronk, 
2009: 169).  
Three and a half years after the water war, Bolivia experienced another powerful 
anti-privatization movement protesting the plan to allow the export of natural gas through 
a Chilean port and to privatize the hydrocarbon sector. According to Perreault (2008: 
247), Bolivia’s gas wars must be understood from an historical perspective of Bolivia’s 
colonial past and present, resource exploitation, social exclusion and extreme poverty 
(Perreault, 2008: 247). In mid-September 2003, the newly formed Coordinadora Nacional 
por la Defensa del Gas began to cooperate with other social movements to pressure the 
government to reverse its plans (Perreault, 2008: 248).  
At the heart of the gas wars was an acknowledgement of the inequalities in 
Bolivia’s past and present that allowed foreign companies to export what was considered 
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national property (Perreault, 2008: 249). On October 12, 2003, after the military killed 
more than twenty people in El Alto, the demands of protesters shifted drastically 
(Perreault, 2008: 250). Instead of demanding the government alter its plans to export gas 
through Chile, protesters instead called for the complete nationalization of national gas 
reserves, therefore strengthening state regulation and weakening foreign influence in the 
sector (Perreault, 2008: 250).  
For some, the gas wars of September-October 2003 represented rising indigenous 
radicalism and the exposure of the unequal and racist nature of the Bolivian state (Spronk 
& Webber, 2007: 35). According to Spronk and Webber (2007: 38), the popular struggles 
against accumulation by dispossession of natural gas contributed to the rise of a protest 
movement with a macro focus. In October 2003, 500,000 protesters gathered in the 
capital city with nation-wide solidarity mobilizations that eventually led to the ousting of 
neoliberal President Sanchez de Lozada (Spronk & Webber, 2007: 35). The second gas 
war in 2005 resulted in a similar experience and led to the resignation of President Carlos 
Mesa (Spronk & Webber, 2007: 38).  
According to the authors, both gas war movements represented serious challenges 
to the neoliberal ideology (Spronk & Webber, 2007: 38). The October 2003 gas wars 
generated a violent state response, leading to Mesa’s verbal attacks against social 
movements challenging government policies and decisions and to the mobilization of 
right-wing forces in Santa Cruz. These movements show that when leaders organize 
around a natural resource that is economically significant, the struggle becomes political, 
ideological and nationalist (Spronk & Webber, 2007: 38).   
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The Cochabamba water war started a wider process of mobilization against 
neoliberal forces and the privatization of natural resources in the country (Spronk, 
2007:19). The movement also encouraged the next conflict over the privatization of a 
municipal water system in El Alto in January 2005. In 1997, French company Aguas del 
Illimani was granted power to control the local water supply (Spronk, 2007: 18). The 
organization the Federation of Neighborhood Organizations of El Alto (FEJUVE), 
created by community residents encompassing more than 500 grassroots organizations, 
was at the head of the struggle protesting the privatization (Spronk, 2007: 19).  
Traditionally, most demands of FEJUVE were based on improving basic services 
such as education, healthcare and water (Spronk, 2007: 19). Following the October 2003 
gas wars, however, FEJUVE expanded its demands and began working on local issues 
and national demands such as a call for a Consistent Assembly and the nationalization of 
natural resources (Spronk, 2007: 19). These demands resulted directly from the new 
public consciousness that the Cochabamba water war helped to construct. The struggle 
against Aguas del Illimani in El Alto began to be framed in terms of protecting the 
economic sovereignty and independence of the country. The contract awarded to the 
company focused solely on the most profitable areas and ignored the consumers who 
were most in need (Spronk, 2007: 19).  
FEJUVE began negotiating with the government in mid-2004 to reverse the 
privatization contract in El Alto. After approximately six months of negotiations, 
FEJUVE called a general strike on January 9, 2005 in which thousands of residents took 
to the streets yelling slogans such as, ‘El Alto on its feet, never on its knees’ (Spronk, 
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2007: 20). On January 11, 2005, residents of the El Alto regions Ballivian and Alto Lima, 
two areas neglected by the new contract, took over several company facilities, including a 
water tank (Spronk, 2007: 20). On the same day, the Mesa government issued a decree 
immediately canceling the privatization contract and on the following day the government 
formalized its decision and the movement successfully reversed the contract. Following 
consultations with neighbourhood councils, FEJUVE ended the strike but warned the 
government it would continue to protest over the prices of electricity and fuel (Spronk, 
2007: 20).  
Shortly after the water war, a variety of anti-privatization movements emerged 
throughout Latin America. In Argentina, for example, a privatization contract with French 
company Vivendi was cancelled because of the company’s weak performance (Dangl, 
2007: 69). In addition, shortly after the movement, the Confederation of Indigenous 
Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) created its own water reform proposal that focused 
on the social, cultural and ecological proponents of consistent and quality water access 
(Dangl, 2007: 69). Despite the 2008 constitutional amendment prohibiting the 
privatization of water, in practice it has not been followed. Currently in the city of 
Guayaquil, municipal water services are controlled by a subsidiary of Bechtel, Interagua. 
Additionally, access to water for irrigation is concentrated with the large land owners who 
have access to sixty-four percent of the available water (Harris et al, 2013: 12). 
Other organizations from a variety of countries have connected themselves to the 
Cochabamba water war (Dangl, 2007: 70). For example, a Uruguayan group held a 2004 
referendum against the privatization of water, supported by Olivera who traveled to the 
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country numerous times prior to the referendum. The water war inspired the movement in 
Uruguay where activists created a new national Coordinadora. The Uruguayan 
referendum was supported by the National Commission in Defense of Water and Life 
(CNDAV), a coalition of civil society organizations in the country (Dangl, 2007: 70).  
The coalition began action in the country in 2002 when the national government 
and the IMF planned to privatize water in Uruguay (Dangl, 2007: 70). Under the deal, the 
cost of water was expected to increase significantly, therefore excluding the majority of 
the Uruguayan population from access. In October 2003, CNDAV presented 283,000 
signatures to parliament, guaranteeing a referendum to be held the following year 
regarding the privatization of water in the country (Dangl, 2007: 70). In October 2004, 
1,440,000 Uruguayans voted to support the constitutional amendment that made access to 
water a human right and that required civil society, consumers and citizen groups to 
participate in all aspects of water management (Dangl, 2007: 70).  
The campaign for constitutional reform in Uruguay was considered successful in 
narrow terms (Spronk and Terhorst, 2012: 149). Currently, under the constitution, water 
resources and services are required to be governed by a publicly controlled utility that 
must ensure the participation of all citizens and workers. As a result, the Uruguayan 
government created the National Directorate for Water and Sanitation Services 
(DINASA) and its Advisory for Water and Sanitation (COASA) in 2007. These 
institutions, however, are not as far reaching as expected by social movements and 
politicians. These reforms are considered to be a state-centric perspective of development 
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and are criticized for their lack of radical change and their exclusion of CNDAV (Spronk 
and Terhorst, 2012 :149). 
In addition to inspiring social movements in Bolivia, the Cochabamba water war 
inspired activists around the world fighting against corporate exploitation by showing 
what was possible through widespread popular protest (Dangl, 2007: 70). The conflict 
symbolized an example of the failure of corporate globalization that pitted large 
corporations against local communities. Instead of solely aiming to improve the 
municipal water system, the rebellion fought against government forces and the 
expansion of neoliberal policies and continued to inspire social movements in the country 
and globally (Dangl, 2007: 70).  
 
Restructuring of labour unions 
The Cochabamba water war led to the restructuring of union leadership and labour 
relations in Cochabamba and Bolivia (Spronk, 2009: 168).  Early in the transition after 
the water war, tensions between the Coordinadora and SEMAPA workers emerged. 
Following the apparent success of the movement, the Coordinadora introduced radical 
proposals aimed at establishing a decentralized public utility supported by community 
and social control through public participation. The union blocked these proposals, 
instead supporting the proposal of the Mayor, which reduced community participation 
(Spronk, 2009: 168). While many Coordinadora activists continued to support the role of 
workers in the reorganization of the public utility, according to Spronk (2009: 168), 
workers seemed less willing to support suggested changes.   
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 By mid-2005, the Coordinadora began to see the SEMAPA union as a barrier to 
implementing real social control of the public utility (Spronk, 2009: 168). Union 
leadership was accused of running a system of clandestine connections that cost the 
company approximately $100,000 per month. Since 2002, relationships between the 
Coordinadora and insurgents within union membership were maintained through 
banderas. These individuals were young activists with a close relationship with the 
Coordinadora who were hired by SEMAPA shortly after the water war. The work of these 
activists generated an insurgent force within the SEMAPA union that was able to 
overthrow the corrupt, mafia-style leadership that ran the company for more than twenty 
years (Spronk, 2009: 168).  
  As a result of the organizing work of banderas, the head of the union “mafia” was 
fired in October 2005 for organizing an illegal strike to protest the firing of a corrupt 
general manager within the company (Spronk, 2009: 169). For the first time in twenty-
five years, elections were held to replace him using secret ballots. Union members also 
had a choice between two platforms of candidates, and over seventy percent of union 
membership voted for the new leadership. While it was unclear whether this signified a 
new direction for the SEMAPA union, at the time it was considered an important step 
towards union democracy (Spronk, 2009: 169). While Olivera emphasized the central role 
of manufacturing workers during the movement in generating relationships between 
urban consumer and indigenous rights organizations, he did not detail the role of workers 
within the water union (Spronk, 2009: 166). This is because public sector unions were 
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often more vulnerable to unequal relationships with corporate actors, resulting in a 
general trade union decline (Spronk, 2009: 166).  
 Public sector unions in Peru formed strong coalitions with community 
organizations to prevent the privatization of public services, which has not occurred in 
Bolivia (Spronk, 2009: 171). In Bolivia, water sector unions were isolated from each 
other since the sector was decentralized thirty years ago. Municipal water companies 
were created by decree in the 1960s and 1970s, when authoritarian regimes transferred 
control of the companies to new regional offices within the central government (Spronk, 
2009: 171). As a result, there was no national labour federation for water workers in the 
country and SEMAPA workers were represented by the Union Confederation of Light, 
Electricity, Telecommunications, Water and Gas Workers of Bolivia. Members of the 
confederation were not vocal about privatization and, as a result, there was a lack of 
support for generating creative and widespread organizing efforts (Spronk, 2009: 172). 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, at the local level the Coordinadora failed to radically democratize 
SEMAPA and to drastically restructure labour unions and it did not achieve its goals of 
increasing efficiency of and expanding access to the water utility. Despite its broad goals, 
the majority of residents did not have consistent access to the utility and the quality of the 
water did not improve immediately following the water war. However, at the national 
level, the water war started a protest cycle that drastically transformed the Bolivian 
political landscape, leading to the election of a socialist and indigenous president. In 
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addition, the water war victory served as inspiration for diverse anti-privatization 
movements in Bolivia, Latin America and globally. Significantly, the victory in 
Cochabamba pressured the Bolivian government to create transparent and participatory 
models of water governance. 
Based on the sentiments expressed by movement leaders and participants, the 
water war victory represented an anti-neoliberal and anti-imperialist social movement 
protesting the privatization of the Cochabamba municipal water system. Because of the 
movement’s strong social base and broad support, the indigenous population was believed 
to have won a victory over the neoliberal government, the ruling class, the IMF and the 
World Bank, and the water corporation owned by the American company Bechtel. 
The water war victory continued to inspire national anti-privatization movements, 
in addition to movements in Argentina, Uruguay, and Peru. In addition to inspiring other 
movements in Bolivia, the water war victory exposed the failures of corporate 
globalization by showing what was possible through widespread protest. This movement 
was unique because it protested the privatization of a resource necessary for human life 
and environmental and community sustainability. The efforts of the government to 
prioritize corporate profit over the health, wellbeing and survival of their citizens 
symbolized an extreme application of neoliberal policies and served to mobilize diverse 
populations in a fight against neoliberal and imperialist hegemony. Most significantly, the 
actions of leaders and participants in the movement re-awakened a political consciousness 
based on anti-imperialist and anti-neoliberal ideas that were focused on challenging 
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transnational forms of power in the country, and on questioning the political intentions of 
the national government (Webber, 2009a: 183). 
Kohl (2006: 306) effectively argues that to successfully challenge the hegemony 
of neoliberalism, social movements must acknowledge the transnational character of the 
policies. According to Moises Arce and Roberta Rice (2009: 92), the social movement 
cycle beginning with the 2000 water war and ending in 2005 targeted Bolivia’s economic 
policies and its exclusionary political systems. However, the uprising also challenged the 
social consequences of neoliberal hegemony and the control of important sectors of the 
economy by transnational corporations. The 2003 protest movement that resulted in the 
resignation of President de Lozada questioned the effectiveness of liberal democracy, free 
markets and of a state that was unrepresentative to the needs of a culturally diverse 
population. The 2003 gas wars posed a significant challenge to neoliberal hegemony 
because it effectively combined national and global perspectives to fulfill its goals. 
Kohl’s argument illustrates how social movements targeting neoliberal policies 
must have a transnational mindset and not be focused solely on national factors. By 
focusing solely on government policies, movement leaders in Latin America would 
ignore the larger global system that perpetuates neoliberal hegemony. Movements must 
be transnational in nature and challenge the dominance of IFIs and must work to diminish 
the international mobility of capital. Examples of these movements are considered 
transnational advocacy networks, or globally linked collectives of social movements. 
These movements include international actors such as government officials, international 
charities, human rights organizations and environmental groups. These networks are 
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established to generate significant pressure on national and international political 









































Dynamics of the Cochabamba Water War 
 
This chapter examines the dynamics of the Cochabamba water war social movement that 
succeeded in ejecting Aguas del Tunari from Bolivia and in reversing the privatization of 
the Cochabamba municipal water system, SEMAPA (Olivera et al, 2004: 8). It briefly 
examines the role of the World Bank in pushing forward the privatization of SEMAPA 
and the response of diverse social and political institutions.  
The chapter examines the origins and dynamics of the water war struggle and 
investigates how Oscar Olivera became the leader of this diverse social movement 
(Shultz, 2009: 17). It outlines the most important social and political actors involved in 
the struggle, the Coordinadora,  Federación Departamental Cochabambina de 
Organizaciones de Regantes (FEDECOR - Departmental Cochabamba Federation of 
Irrigators Organizations) and the Departamental de Trabajadores Fabriles de Cochabamba 
(Fabriles – Cochabamba Federation of Factory Workers) (Dangl, 2007: 62). The chapter 
then investigates how various levels of participation were embedded within the 
Coordinadora structure (Olivera et al, 2004: 37). It goes on to describe the diverse actions 
of the Coordiandora and how it mobilized a variety of populations (Olivera et al, 2004, p. 
55). Following this, the protest methods encouraged by the Coordinadora are investigated, 
such as blockades, and public mobilizations (Olivera et al, 2004: 41). The chapter finishes 
with an analysis of the significance of the Coordinadora’s actions and ideologies and a 
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conclusion discussing what lessons can be drawn from the movement's methods and 
outcomes (Shultz, 2009: 9). 
 
The Neoliberal Agenda and the World Bank 
The World Bank was the driving force behind water privatization in Bolivia. In 1999, a 
contract transferred control of the Cochabamba municipal water system, Servicio 
Municipal de Agua Potable de Cochabamba (SEMAPA) to a transnational corporation, 
Aguas del Tunari (Spronk and Webber, 2007: 39). The anti-privatization movement that 
followed in Cochabamba succeeded in ejecting Aguas del Tunari from Bolivia (Olivera et 
al, 2004: 8). Following the World Bank recommendation that dam construction must not 
be funded by the public sector, the most stable source was considered to be the individual 
users. To pay for the dam construction project, the company increased water fees, 
triggering the Cochabamba water war of 2000 (Spronk and Webber, 2007: 39).  Although 
the water war was primarily a regional struggle, it quickly gained national importance. 
The Bolivian government was forced to cancel its contract with Aguas del Tunari, to 
return the water system to public control and to cancel legislation that enabled its 
privatization (Perreault, 2006: 165).  
 
Origins of the Struggle 
The Cochabamba water war began in the rural countryside over conflicts concerning rock 
and cement irrigation canals that farmers used to bring water to the crops (Shultz, 2009: 
16). Under the privatization contract, the Bolivian government approved a water law that 
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put the trenches under its control, allowing the government to transfer ownership of water 
to Aguas del Tunari, owned in large part by Bechtel, forcing residents in the countryside 
to protest against this plan (Shultz, 2009: 16). In November 1999, the Federation of 
Irrigators staged a one-day blockade on the highways leading in and out of the city. 
According to irrigation union leader Omar Fernandez, the purpose of this blockade was to 
test the capacity of the people to protest against the privatization plan (Shultz, 2009: 16).  
Shortly after, the irrigators visited Oscar Olivera and in his office, farmers, factory 
workers, environmentalists and others discussed the governments’ plan to transfer control 
of the water system to Bechtel and the possible implications of this action (Shultz, 2009: 
17). At this meeting, they decided to launch a city-wide rebellion against this plan and 
formed an alliance, the Coordinadora, to do so. The Coordinadora was understood as a 
response to what they believed was a total failure of local institutions to protect the 
wellbeing of community residents. Cochabamba’s mayor at the time, Manfred Reyes, for 
example, signed the agreement that authorized the transfer of control over the municipal 
water utility to Bechtel (Shultz, 2009: 17).  
 
Important Actors – the Coordinadora and the Fabriles 
The Coordinadora was the most important actor during the Cochabamba water war. It was 
founded in December 1999 by various social movements and organizations, including 
Federación Departamental Cochabambina de Organizaciones de Regante (FEDECOR) 
and the local trade union Federación Departamental de Trabajadores Fabriles de 
Cochabamba (Fabriles) (Ochoa et al, 2002: 70). The mobilizations and protests in 
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Cochabamba were organized horizontally and encompassed diverse populations, such as 
coca farmers and irrigators in rural areas who organized highway blockades pressuring 
the government to listen to the demands of the Coordinadora (Dangl, 2007: 62).  
According to Olivera (2004: 25), the organization of the water war began five 
years prior to the first protests and when efforts first began, water was not considered a 
prominent issue in Bolivian society. The Coordinadora began with an effort to rebuild the 
social network of solidarity that was destroyed by neoliberalism. Several leaders in the 
Fabriles started a project to address issues facing contemporary unions through engaging 
with small and large unionized workplaces (Olivera et al, 2004: 25). The purpose of this 
project was to learn of the situations experienced by workers who were predominately 
neglected during mainstream union organizing efforts. This project resulted in the 
development of various citizens’ proposals in which leaders disseminated labour market 
information at street markets and through mainstream media (Olivera et al, 2004: 25).  
These projects made it possible for mainly unorganized workers to connect with 
the Fabriles and to benefit from its activism efforts. Through these efforts, the union 
discovered that there was a portion of the workplace in which individuals had no basic 
rights to decent hours, wages or job security (Olivera et al, 2004: 25). Through projects to 
educate themselves and the public about unorganized workplaces, the Fabriles became a 
central institution for workers in which individuals could see solutions to their problems. 
As years passed, the Fabriles became known for its efforts to understand the macro-level 
issues that impacted workers in the region (Olivera et al, 2004: 26).  
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During the last few months of 1999, the Fabriles cooperated with an organization 
called Pueblo en Marcha (People on the Move) in which professionals, economists, and 
elected officials met every Tuesday in the main Cochabamba plaza to increase attention 
on important societal issues (Olivera et al, 2004: 27). Pueblo en Marcha had various 
innovative forms of protest. For example, leaders constructed boards with names of 
politicians and how they voted on a specific issue, and decided which individuals were 
corrupt and which were not. Many members also belonged to the Committee in Defense 
of Water and the Family Economy (Olivera et al, 2004: 27). On November 4 and 5, a 
group of irrigation farmers organized a strong road blockade to protest a new water law 
perceived to be harmful to irrigator rights. The group called a meeting on November 12, 
1999 in which the Coordinadora was formed (Olivera et al, 2004: 27).  
At the time, the Fabriles had an adequate infrastructure including meeting rooms, 
Internet connection, phones and informal meeting areas and it was proposed that the 
Coordinadora should be based out of the Fabriles office (Olivera et al, 2004: 28). The 
Fabriles began to sponsor informational meetings and became more involved in the 
municipal water struggle despite not having a strong understanding of the issues. During a 
large public meeting at the Fabriles office, members of Pueblo en Marcha explained the 
water struggle in great detail and outlined how the proposed law would adversely impact 
local water systems. Following this meeting, leaders of the Fabriles became strong 
supporters of the water struggle (Olivera et al, 2004: 28).  
Irrigation farmers and associations from the lower, central and upper valleys of 
the Cochabamba state were brought together through the Fabriles. These farmers were 
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well organized and solidly opposed to Law 2029 (Olivera et al, 2004: 54). Another 
important social group within the movement was the professional class. They had fewer 
members involved, but were able to influence public opinion regarding the water 
privatization contract (Olivera et al, 2004: 54). The Fabriles’ ability to coordinate popular 
discontent through its disapproval of the poor working conditions experienced by 
unionized, non-unionized and flexible workers resulted in cooperation between the 
professional and irrigator sectors (Olivera et al, 2004: 54). During the end of 1999, a 
campaign sponsored by various professional schools broadcasted the inconsistencies 
within the Aguas del Tunari contract. The campaign also debated how best to regulate 
water distribution, and how to consume water as a crucial element of life. The 
Coordinadora’s concerns of mobilizing against the oppression of Law 2029 emerged 
through this campaign (Olivera et al, 2004: 54).  
The Coordinadora did not have connections to a specific ideology or political 
party, was not legally recognized and functioned through open and public assemblies 
(Ochoa et al, 2002: 71). The Coordinadora organized peasants, teachers, businessmen, 
water cooperatives, indigenous peoples, environmental groups, community organizations 
and manufacturing workers under a common goal of fighting against neoliberal policies, 
protesting the extreme price hikes for water, and regaining control of the municipal water 
system (Olivera et al, 2004: 56-57).  
During the water war, the Coordinadora mobilized diverse populations, became 
the conscience of the people, monitored and questioned business and government actions, 
and fought for the demands of the broader population (Olivera et al, 2004: 28-29). The 
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Coordinadora supported direct political participation through a continuing process of 
collective decision-making, instead of solely voting in elections every four years (Olivera 
et al, 2004: 28-29). Similarly to the horizontal decision-making structure of the 
Coordinadora, all populations had an equal opportunity to contribute to the decision-
making processes. While peasants, labour leaders and middle class citizens had different 
needs and working and living conditions, they had similar goals of challenging the actions 
of the Bolivian government, the extreme price hikes, and the imposition of neoliberalism 
(Olivera et al, 2004: 28-29).  
 
The Structure of the Coordinadora 
Various levels of participation were incorporated into assemblies or popular meetings. 
Assemblies were a space for communal participation in which workers were organized 
according to sector, for example into groups of irrigation farmers, factory workers or 
businessmen. This method allowed all participants to not only verbalize complaints about 
the price increases, but to debate ideas and solutions to common problems (Olivera et al, 
2004: 37). These assemblies were considered political spaces in which similar groups 
could discuss issues and attempt to reach a consensus concerning solutions to their 
challenges (Olivera et al, 2004: 38). 
The next level of social participation consisted of the Coordinadora assemblies in 
which each small assembly sent representatives to present ideas and propose solutions 
(Olivera et al, 2004: 38). Representatives were informal but were required to accurately 
represent the needs of the collective group. Individuals from a variety of sectors, such as 
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environmentalist groups or teachers, attended the assemblies and those who did not fit 
into a particular sector attended these second-level assemblies to voice their challenges 
(Olivera et al, 2004, p. 38). Significantly, these assemblies were where political and 
strategic analysis occurred and the decisions made during this process were taken to the 
cabildos, or town meetings, held in public plazas with approximately fifty to seventy 
thousand people (Olivera et al, 2004: 38). At this level of participation, although 
representatives addressed large crowds, democratic participation and discussion was 
emphasized. The crowd responded to different proposals by expressing different 
sentiments, either through disapproval or applause (Olivera et al, 2004: 38).  
The Coordinadora used this style of assembly to discuss how to break the conflict 
with the government (Olivera et al, 2004: 38). Coordinadora leaders presented the idea of 
allowing the government twenty-four hours to rip up the Aguas del Tunari contract in 
front of the assembly. However, the crowd disagreed with this tactic and wanted a more 
immediate result through taking over the Aguas del Tunari offices in Cochabamba 
(Olivera et al, 2004: 38). Olivera (2004: 38) states that the people did take over the 
company offices, tearing down its signs and occupying the building. However, as a result 
of the social self-regulation within the group, there was no physical destruction of 
property.  
 
Actions of the Coordinadora 
The movement in Cochabamba contrasted greatly with previous movements that were 
organized around trade union forms of organization (Olivera et al, 2004: 55). These 
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movements were mobilized around rejecting specific political actions or demanding a 
specific law that would greater meet the populations’ needs. From the beginning, the 
social movement in Cochabamba placed specific crucial questions on the agenda such as: 
how should collective issues be decided; how should an inclusive notion of the common 
good be collectively constructed; and most significantly, how can full autonomy from the 
state be encouraged through the Coordinadora’s proposals to regulate water (Olivera et al, 
2004: 55)? Significantly, the Coordiandora’s emphasis on citizen autonomy questioned 
the monopoly that legally recognized political parties exercised over decision-making 
(Olivera et al, 2004: 55).  
The Coordinadora also attempted to reform critical municipal organizations based 
on principles of direct political participation and democracy (Spronk and Webber, 2007: 
41). In December 2002, for example, the Coordinadora proposed to disband the municipal 
water company and replace it with an organization owned and operated by its users based 
on democratic decision-making processes. The municipal government refused this 
proposal, claiming that the Coordinadora could not be recognized under Bolivian law 
(Spronk and Webber, 2007: 41). However, the government did enable SEMAPA to 
incorporate more communal ‘social control’ in the daily functioning of the company. As a 
result, in 2005, the board of directors that previously incorporated politicians and 
professionals encompassed three elected members from different areas of Cochabamba 
(Spronk and Webber, 2007: 41).  
In addition, the Coordinadora mobilized diverse populations against committees 
that leaders perceived as harmful to the goals of the movement (Olivera et al, 2004: 29). 
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The Civic Committee, for example, consisted mostly of mayors and members of the local 
elite and played a crucial role in maintaining the Aguas del Tunari privatization contract. 
Despite the committee’s continuous attempts to gain widespread media attention and 
influence, the Coordinadora refused to recognize the influence of the Civic Committee 
(Olivera et al, 2004: 29).    
The Coordinadora also used more traditional forms of social protest to bring 
attention to the extreme price hikes such as occupying government offices, public 
marches and protests and road blockades. With the assistance of intellectuals, the 
Coordinadora also provided alternative background information about the regional and 
global fight against privatization and neoliberal globalization (Nilsson and Gustafsson, 
2012: 102). The Coordinadora did not have a political affiliation and believed that 
dominant political institutions and ideologies did not provide Cochabamba citizens with 
basic needs. The Coordinadora also had an extraordinary ability to mobilize diverse 
populations and organizations that were impacted by the privatization of water (Nilsson 
and Gustafsson, 2012: 102). 
Within the Coordinadora, assembly-style democracy and collective meetings were 
crucial, and starting in April 2000, citywide meetings with representatives required to 
accurately represent the views of the collective group were common (Olivera et al, 2004: 
56-57). Following the protests of April 2000, the city was governed and controlled by its 
residents through the collective assemblies and meetings that were run by the 
Coordinadora (Bakker, 2008: 238). The Coordinadora experienced relative success 
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through its emphasis on being a public space for collective decision-making and informal 
learning (Olivera et al, 2004: 58).  
The Coordinadora encouraged the direct political participation of all Cochabamba 
residents through reinforcing principles of communal and cooperative politics (Olivera et 
al, 2004: 56). The Coordinadora used this method during every stage of the movement, 
for example, during public rallies and the drafting of negotiation proposals. To enforce 
these principles, the Coordinadora empowered representatives or spokespeople instead of 
institutions, requiring them to accurately represent the needs of the collective group 
(Olivera et al, 2004: 56). The political activities of the Coordinadora included large 
meetings with tens of thousands of people and small meetings or assemblies with various 
representatives responsible for maintaining the organization (Olivera et al, 2004: 57).  
The Coordinadora played a significant role in the organization of the protests and 
street blockades that ultimately led to the rejection of the Aguas del Tunari privatization 
contract (Dangl, 2007: 62). Blockades were organized through a complex local structure 
of decision-making. Representatives from different communities gathered to coordinate 
actions and would return home to discuss methods with neighbours (Dangl, 2007: 66). 
Community leaders also collected food donations, elected leaders democratically, and 
organized soup kitchens. In addition, as a gesture of solidarity, others brought food into 
the city centre for protest participants (Dangl, 2007: 67).   
The Coordinadora initially represented peasant farmers, irrigators and local water 
communities (Olivera et al, 2004: 28). The water cooperatives included individuals who 
were not connected to the municipal water system, but had constructed personal wells. 
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The Coordinadora also included unionized workers who, because of their experiences 
with widespread labour struggles, were able to contribute crucial tactical protest methods 
(Olivera et al, 2004: 28). On December 1, 1999, Olivera and the Coordinadora called its 
first mobilization for rural and urban workers of Cochabamba by challenging government 
actions regarding water access and other public services (Olivera et al, 2004: 30). The 
purpose was to launch a campaign against a common problem that had previously divided 
residents and the turnout at this demonstration was larger than at any municipal election 
candidate rally (Olivera et al, 2004: 30). The protest transformed into an open town 
meeting in which the Coordinadora and the people decided to give the municipal 
government until January 11 to eliminate the Aguas del Tunari contract, to repeal harmful 
water legislation and to reduce service rates. The Coordinadora guaranteed that if these 
demands were not met, that there would be blockades along all regional highways and 
roads (Olivera et al, 2004: 30).  
On January 13, 2000 the movement was able to force the government to agree to 
revise the contract and the water law (Olivera et al, 2004: 32). However, the government 
refused to negotiate rate hikes. As a result, the Coordinadora took the agreement to 
Cochabamba residents, who, through a general assembly, agreed they would refuse to pay 
the rate hikes (Olivera et al, 2004: 32). Instead of paying the bills, Cochabamba residents 
brought them to representatives of the Coordinadora who burned stacks of bills in the 
main public plaza, an action of great symbolic significance. The agreement gave the 
government three months to respond to important points for the Coordinadora. 
Cochabamba residents decided to plan a peaceful demonstration without road blockades 
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for February 4, 2000, which was violently suppressed by the government and police 
forces (Olivera et al, 2004: 32).  
Following extreme violence, police repression, and the signing of a contract 
involving a freeze on rate hikes, the Coordiandora organized a popular referendum in 
March 2000 in which more than fifty thousand Cochabamba residents voted that Aguas 
del Tunari had to leave Bolivia and laws that enabled privatization of water had to be 
repealed. However, by the middle of March, it was clear to the Coordinadora that the 
government did not intend to concede on any of the movement’s demands (Olivera et al, 
2004: 36).  
Members of Congress stated that they would consider revising Law 2029, but 
would not change it (Olivera et al, 2004: 36). As a result, the Coordinadora changed its 
tactics and, instead of requesting a revision of the contract, they decided that Aguas del 
Tunari must be ejected from Bolivia. Because of the participation of coca farmers in the 
Coordinadora, the government portrayed the Coordinadora as members of the drug trade 
and as a dangerous gang, therefore delegitimizing the struggle and its actions (Olivera et 
al, 2004: 36). Two months later, on April 4, the “Last Battle” was organized which 
consisted of eight days of blockades and thousands of protesters in the city centre. On the 
final eighth day, one hundred thousand people were mobilized and the movement 
succeeded in ejecting the company (Olivera et al, 2004: 36). In addition, as a result of the 
Coordinadora proposal, Law 2029 was drastically modified, allowing more protection 
against the privatization of public services. At the time, this victory was considered the 
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first victory against neoliberalism over the last fifteen years in Bolivia (Olivera et al, 
2004: 36).  
The Coordinadora established itself as an organization mobilizing ordinary 
working people who were predominately dispossessed and whose needs were ignored 
during political debates. It was considered a space to discuss common problems, to 
verbalize demands and to plan protests and mobilizations (Olivera et al, 2004: 58). In 
addition, the widespread participation of Cochabamba residents in the Coordinadora 
illustrates that working people had confidence in the organization’s abilities to meet their 
needs and saw it as a tool of collective action and mobilization (Olivera et al, 2004: 59).  
 
Protest tactics 
Road blockades were not a new protest method in Bolivia and were used previous to the 
water war during mining union struggles (Shultz, 2009: 19). In Cochabamba, 
approximately once or twice a year, the transportation or electrical workers staged 
blockades in which buses and taxis would not run, bridges were closed and most schools 
and businesses were shut down (Shultz, 2009: 19). These blockades, however, were not 
considered to have political implications and were mainly treated as holidays from work 
or school.  During these blockades, families spent time at home and children played 
soccer, as negotiators attempted to find a settlement (Shultz, 2009: 19). However, the first 
blockade of the Cochabamba water war had a different sentiment behind it. For three 
days, Cochabamba was shut down; the airport was closed; bus and other public 
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transportation services were suspended; and thousands of protesters took over the main 
plaza (Shultz, 2009: 20).  
Movement participants had roles specific to their ages and physical capabilities. 
Cochabamba residents of all ages had their faces painted to represent the struggles they 
experienced and young people wore leather gloves to throw rocks into government and 
company buildings (Olivera et al, 2004: 41). In addition, protest participants wore gloves 
to string barbed wire on posts from one side of the street to the other and middle-aged 
women had buckets of water ready to pour over the gas canisters thrown by police 
officers. Importantly, Olivera (2004: 41) describes a significant level of trust among all 
movement participants. People lent money to others to buy supplies for the sake of the 
movement and its goals without worrying about physical or monetary gain (Olivera et al, 
2004: 41). Movement participants also felt that they had a duty to protect each other, for 
example, Olivera was told to change clothing because there had been orders to assassinate 
him (Olivera et al, 2004: 41).  
There was an instant and emotional response following the arrest of Coordinadora 
leaders on April 6, 2000. Young people who called themselves ‘water warriors’ travelled 
downtown to challenge President Hugo Banzer’s soldiers and women traveled door to 
door to collect donations and food for those protesting in the city’s main plaza (Shultz, 
2003: 35).  In February 2000, an unarmed seventeen-year-old boy, Victor Hugo Daza, 
was shot and instantly killed by a bullet through his face. Following this act of police 
repression, hundreds of people worldwide sent emails to the Bechtel CEO demanding that 
the company leave Cochabamba and Bolivia (Shultz, 2003: 36). As a result of the 
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continually increasing strength of the movement, Bechtel officials fled the country, the 
water privatization contract was cancelled, and a publicly controlled water company was 
installed (Shultz, 2003: 36). Just a few days after the victory, Olivera spoke at the April 
2000 IMF and World Bank protests in Washington, emphasizing the harmfulness of 
forced privatization in connection to the Cochabamba example. The Cochabamba water 
war became an international symbol of resistance against the imposition of neoliberal 
globalization (Shultz, 2003: 36). 
There were a variety of factors that enabled the movement to achieve its basic 
goals of reversing SEMAPA’s privatization and ejecting Aguas del Tunari from Bolivia.. 
First, negotiations were combined with effective representation and pressure on relevant 
actors (Bustamante, 2004: 42). Despite government hostility and efforts to delegitimize 
the organization, the Coordinadora remained the legitimate representative of the needs of 
Cochabamba residents. The Coordindadora also encouraged participation through 
negotiations with the government. However, when this tactic was unsuccessful, it shifted 
to public demonstrations to increase pressure on the government (Bustamante, 2004: 42). 
Also, the social organizations involved in the protests advanced technical arguments 
against the privatization of the water system, in contrast to the predominately ideological 
and political arguments enforced in previous social movements in Latin America 
(Bustamante, 2004: 42). The Coordinadora and other organizations also had a strong 
ability to construct alternative proposals. During the protests, not only were the main 
demands of protesters verbalized, but changes in demands were also developed to address 
the harmful nature of laws that enabled the privatization of water (Bustamante, 2004: 42).  
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Strong alliances and partnerships were formed between urban and rural sectors of 
Cochabamba (Bustamante, 2004: 43). These alliances allowed the movement to grow in 
strength and greatly expanded the movement’s demands of the government. Finally, 
direct democracy was a central factor in the success of the movement. All decisions were 
taken to open spaces in which the entire population was explicitly encouraged to 
participate (Bustamante, 2004: 43). These open meetings decided future steps and actions 
of the movement in a decisive and inclusive way, therefore encouraging direct political 
participation, for example, through the referendum put forward by the Coordinadora with 
participation from over 50,000 Cochabamba citizens (Bustamante, 2004: 43).  
 
Significance of the Coordinadora 
The Coordinadora, as a rural/urban and multiclass alliance, was understood to have 
overcome many challenges that conventional trade unions and ‘old’ social movements 
experienced. Current Bolivian Vice-President Alvaro Garcia Linera argues that the 
Coordinadora and similar organizations “do not create a border between members and 
nonmembers in the way that the unions used to” (Spronk, 2007: 9). According to this 
view, unions no longer represented the views of the general population and informal 
workers because of hierarchical leadership structures, closed-membership rules, and legal 
contracts. In contrast, the Coordinadora was a more effective structure to organize the 
working class because the only criterion for membership was participation in daily 




Through the water war struggles, Olivera explains that movement participants and leaders 
learned three distinct lessons. First, it was ordinary people that had cooperated to achieve 
real social justice (Olivera et al, 2004: 49). Second, he explains that all fear, isolation and 
selfishness of Cochabamba residents disappeared and was replaced by actions of 
solidarity and cooperation. During the worst confrontations, people handed out water and 
food, took over communications, or gave rides to protesters and leaders (Olivera et al, 
2004: 49). Finally, Olivera (2004: 49) states that Cochabamba residents learned they 
wanted a participatory democracy, and that any other political system would not enable 
them to independently meet their needs. However, Cochabamba residents did not exert 
significant social control over the company’s functioning because activists did not make 
enough of an effort to connect local populations to the technical aspects of running the 
water utility (Ochoa et al, 2009: 79). Cochabamba residents wanted a government that 
prioritized the needs and health of its own population over the goals of international 
financial institutions and neoliberal politicians (Olivera et al, 2004: 49).  
Over time, the slogan “The Water is Ours” grew in importance as it began to 
symbolize the idea that decision-making should be a collective experience (Olivera et al, 
2004: 55). The slogan also challenged what the movement perceived as irresponsible and 
arbitrary government actions that led to the privatization of the municipal water system 
and extreme price hikes for water services. Following the widespread use of this slogan, a 
new way of understanding and practicing politics developed that focused on cooperating 
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around common demands and undertaking decision-making based on wide-spread 
political participation (Olivera et al, 2004: 55). 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the Coordinadora and other social movement organizations utilized diverse 
protest methods to fight for the demands of the broader population and to support direct 
political participation (Olivera et al, 2004: 28-29). The actions of the Coordinadora 
represented a direct challenge to the neoliberal policy of privatizing water because it 
created a space for communal participation that encouraged all residents to participate in 
political processes, thereby negating the influence and role of political and economic 
elites in the country (Olivera et al, 2004: 37-38). Most significantly, the actions of Olivera 
and the Coordinadora helped residents understand that the neoliberal system in Bolivia 
was more concerned with obtaining profit over the wellbeing of the people, and that 
residents wanted a participatory democratic system that would enable them to 
independently meet their needs (Olivera et al, 2004: 49). 
Many lessons can be drawn from the experience of the Coordinadora (Nilsson and 
Gustafsson, 2012: 102). By deciding to not have an official political affiliation, 
Coordinadora activists acknowledged that social movement leaders may need to look 
beyond state control and apparatuses in order to fully achieve their goals (Nilsson and 
Gustafsson, 2012: 102). In the case of the water war, the Coordinadora did not connect 
itself to any political party because it believed that general political institutions failed to 
provide the basic needs of Cochabamba citizens. Movement leaders elsewhere can use 
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this tactic to attempt to find political alternatives to traditional state structures (Nilsson 
and Gustafsson, 2012: 102).  
Olivera (2004: 28-29) emphasizes processes of collective and informal learning 
through the formation of the Coordinadora and the cooperation among all populations 
during national protests. This suggests that populations can learn from each other about 
the best methods to achieve their goals. Social movement organizers can also learn from 
the Coordinadora's mobilization of a variety of diverse populations (Olivera et al, 2004: 
28). By mobilizing populations from so many classes and occupations, movement 
organizers can connect their goals and ideas to broader populations, therefore 
encouraging more support for their cause. The success of the movement was a 
combination of strong organizing efforts and the strong societal reaction to the 
privatization of water and the exorbitant price increases that followed. Without the 
Coordinadora, the diverse populations that reacted so strongly to the privatization would 
not have had a clear avenue to organize and to challenge the government policy of 
privatization (Olivera et al, 2004: 28). In addition, movement organizers can utilize the 
diverse experiences and ideas of their supporters. The Coordinadora, for example, 
mobilized unionized workers because of their experiences with widespread labour 
struggles and their knowledge of tactical protest methods (Olivera et al, 2004: 28). 
In addition, social movement organizers can draw from the Coordinadora 
experience of encouraging direct political participation by utilizing principles of 
communal and cooperative politics (Olivera et al, 2004: 56). Protest methods that 
encourage direct political participation can result in more widespread support for the 
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goals of social movements by encouraging people of all classes to participate (Olivera et 
al, 2004: 56). By encouraging direct political participation, movement leaders can enable 
citizens to take ownership of their lives by participating in open meetings to decide the 
future steps and actions of the movement in a participatory way (Bustamante, 2004: 43). 
The Coordinadora’s ideas of direct political participation directly challenged 
Western notions of participatory democracy (Oliver et al, 2004: 28-29). Instead of 
participating in politics through elections every four years, leaders and participants in the 
water war protests wanted an ongoing process of collective decision-making including 
direct citizen participation, and were successful in establishing this system throughout the 
water war movement. However, the movement’s momentum did not translate into direct 
political results in the immediate aftermath of the movement. This idea posed a threat to 
perceived Western dominance and superiority in the Latin American region and other 
parts of the world by showcasing a different method of coming to political decisions 
(Olivera et al, 2004: 28-29). In the model encouraged by the Coordinadora, all citizens 
took ownership over the political process and influenced the political functioning of the 











Through a strong and diverse community coalition, the Coordinadora successfully 
reversed the privatization of SEMAPA and transferred control of the water system back 
to the public sector (Olivera et al, 2004: 8). This chapter examines how the diverse and 
multi-dimensional nature of the movement led to its successes in achieving its goals. Part 
1 shows how movement organizers can expand their support base to achieve broader 
goals of societal transformation (Shultz, 2009: 9). It investigates how the actions of the 
Coordinadora represented a direct challenge to the neoliberal policy of privatizing water 
because it created a space for communal political participation that directly encouraged 
all Cochabamba residents to influence the political process. This neglected the influence 
and importance of political and economic elites that enforced and encouraged the 
neoliberal ideology on a global scale (Olivera et al, 2004: 49). 
Part 2 examines the broader implications of the movement’s immediate impacts 
and achievements in the following areas: local political impacts; impacts on national and 
global policy; increased focus on water issues; inspiration provided for other social 
movements; and the restructuring of labour unions related to the struggle over the 
privatization of water.  It connects each of these categories to broader political and social 
transformation in Bolivia and determines whether the movement successfully challenged 
the neoliberal policy of privatizing water. Finally, the chapter connects the movement’s 
achievements and shortcomings to anti-neoliberal social movements on a global scale and 
  115 
discusses implications for the future of the movement in Bolivia and elsewhere in Latin 
America. The thesis concludes with an investigation of the current issues of water 
provision in Cochabamba focusing on the shortcomings of SEMAPA in providing quality 
and consistent water services. 
 
How movement dynamics led to its success 
In addition to its direct goals of reversing SEMAPA’s privatization and ejecting Aguas 
del Tunari from Bolivia, the movement also attempted to rebuild the solidarity networks 
and relationships that were destroyed by the expansion of neoliberal policies and to 
propose political alternatives to the dominant practices of Western liberal democracy 
(Olivera et al, 2004: 25). Unlike traditional political parties, the Coordinadora was not 
connected to a specific ideology or political party, was not legally recognized and 
functioned through open and public assemblies (Ochoa et al, 2002: 71). The main purpose 
of the organization was to organize the broader Cochabamba population including 
teachers, community organizations, businessmen, water cooperatives, indigenous peoples, 
women, children, environmentalist groups and manufacturing workers with a common 
goal of challenging the neoliberal policy of privatizing water and transferring control of 
the municipal water system back to the public sector (Olivera et al, 2004: 56-57).  
The structure of the Coordinadora encouraged participation by creating assemblies 
in which populations and workers were organized by occupation or category and 
participants were encouraged to directly participate in the political structure of the 
movement by debating ideas and problems to attempt to reach a consensus. This method 
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transferred political participation and influence away from political elites to local 
communities, thereby rejecting political and economic structures that favoured elite 
interests over the health and wellbeing of local communities (Olivera et al, 2004: 38). 
 At the next level of social participation, each assembly was required to pick a 
representative to present ideas and challenges to the larger group. The decisions made in 
this process were taken to larger assemblies that occurred in public spaces with 
approximately fifty to seventy thousand people (Olivera et al, 2004: 38). By expanding 
the process to a larger audience, movement organizers further legitimized local political 
participation and placed greater emphasis on the needs of local populations over the needs 
of economic and political elites in the country. Additionally, this process challenged 
narrow versions of democracy that involved voting for a president once every four years. 
Instead, movement organizers emphasized that political participation must be a 
continuous and evolving process in which all participants must be actively engaged and 
educated regarding the issues up for debate. During the movement, this process 
represented a challenge to Western ideals of democracy and to Western dominance and 
influence over the daily lives of Bolivian citizens (Olivera et al, 2004: 38).  
 During the water war, the Coordinadora became the voice of the general 
population by directly monitoring and questioning the actions and policies of business 
and government and by fighting for the needs of the general population. Movement 
leaders proposed a challenge to Western ideals of political participation in the country by 
encouraging a new political process in which all populations had an equal opportunity to 
influence decision-making. While each distinct population group had different goals and 
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needs, they were united by the collective goal of challenging the actions of the Bolivian 
government, the extreme price hikes, and the imposition of neoliberalism in the country 
(Olivera et al, 2004: 28-29). 
 The decision-making structure of the Coordinadora influenced how it organized 
protests and public mobilizations. Road blockades, for example, were organized through a 
complex hierarchy of local decision-making structures. Representatives from different 
communities would gather in public spaces to coordinate actions and returned to their 
specific communities to discuss and debate protest methods with neighbours and 
community members. Additionally, community leaders also collected food donations, 
elected leaders democratically and organized soup kitchens. Through a continuous 
emphasis on local dynamics and needs, the movement placed greater emphasis on the 
needs of the local population over those of IFIs and the Bolivian government (Dangl, 
2007: 66-67).    
 Scholars argue that the Cochabamba water war was an example of an anti-
imperialist and anti-neoliberal social movement that protested the privatization of the 
city’s water commons and the price hikes that followed (Spronk and Webber, 2007: 32 
and Webber, 2009a: 183). According to Webber (2009a: 183), the movement’s 
achievements of reversing SEMAPA’s privatization and ejecting Aguas del Tunari from 
Bolivia represented the country’s first victory against the neoliberal ideology since 1985. 
As a result of the movement’s strong support across a wide range of populations and a 
strong reaction to exorbitant price hikes, indigenous and working classes were understood 
to have won a victory against the country’s ruling class, the national government, 
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international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, and the 
transnational water corporation owned by American corporation Bechtel (Webber, 2009a: 
183). 
This movement was a different process than other anti-neoliberal social 
movements in Latin America because privatizing water was an extreme application of 
neoliberal policies. Unlike other natural resources or infrastructure systems, water is 
crucial to human and environmental survival and the idea of access to water as a basic 
human right was critical to the movement’s success in reversing the privatization of 
SEMAPA (Webber, 2009a: 183). Leaders successfully generated a strong protest 
movement in rural and urban areas to protest the privatization of water, a resource 
necessary for human life, the price hikes, and more generally the imposition of neoliberal 
policies. It resulted in a struggle between a strong community coalition and government 
forces that resulted in the expulsion of the foreign water corporation from the country and 
the reversal of SEMAPA’s privatization (Olivera et al, 2004: 28). 
 
Impacts and achievements of the movement 
This thesis shows that despite the movement ejecting Aguas del Tunari from Bolivia, the 
Coordinadora did not achieve its goal of radically democratizing the public utility to 
ensure greater levels of public participation within SEMAPA (Bakker, 2008: 239). The 
broad achievements of the movement did not translate into greater coverage under 
SEMAPA. In 2006, for example, less than half the Cochabamba population was 
connected to the SEMAPA system, and inefficiency, corruption among leadership, and a 
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lack of resources continually hindered the success of SEMAPA (Bakker, 2008: 239). The 
main reason for this was that under a variety of neoliberal Bolivian governments from 
2000 to 2005, few financial resources were put into the newly nationalized water utility 
(Spronk & Webber, 2007: 21). At present, while the re-nationalized SEMAPA has more 
than tripled its service area since the water war victory, approximately forty percent of the 
city’s residents, mostly in the hilly southern districts, still lack access to water and 
sanitation services. Additionally, those connected to the municipal water system 
experience inconsistent and low quality water services (Achtenberg, 2013). 
 Despite its insignificant impacts on the newly nationalized water utility, the water 
war movement had substantial affects on national and global policy. The water war 
victory led to institutions such as the World Bank having to defend its neoliberal policy of 
privatization (Shultz, 2009: 28). At the national level, however, the movement led to a 
shift in Bolivian political dynamics. After April 2000, for example, weak national 
governments were required to share political power with strong social movements as 
opposed to military actors (Shultz, 2009: 29).  
The first explicit evidence of the movement’s impacts on Bolivian politics came 
with the election of Evo Morales, an indigenous social movement leader, as president of 
Bolivia. The water war victory initiated a five-year protest cycle that involved the 
Bolivian population directly challenging the neoliberal policies of Bolivian governments. 
This general environment of challenging neoliberal hegemony gave momentum to 
Morales’ presidential campaign in 2005. Morales based his platform on establishing a 
direct challenge to the neoliberal principles found within the Washington Consensus and 
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voting for him became a direct sign of solidarity for those involved in the Cochabamba 
struggle (Shultz, 2009: 29). Additionally, following the movement, new pressure was 
placed on the government to create a participatory model of water governance (Boelens, 
et al., 2010: 288). Following support from the IDB, the Bolivian government created the 
Inter-Institutional Water Council (CONIAG), a multi-stakeholder forum encompassing 
representatives from the private sector, NGOs, government, civil society, the irrigator 
movement and other social movements (Boelens et al., 2010: 289). 
The water war social movement also served as inspiration for other anti-
privatization social movements in Bolivia regarding water and natural gas, in Latin 
America, and globally (Spronk, 2009: 169). Scholars argue that the gas wars of 
September-October 2003 represented rising indigenous radicalism and the exposure of the 
racist and unequal nature of Bolivian society (Spronk & Webber, 2007: 38). In October 
2003, 500,000 protesters gathered in La Paz, Bolivia, in nation-wide solidarity 
mobilizations leading to the ousting of neoliberal President Sanchez de Lozada (Spronk 
and Webber, 2007: 35). The second gas war in 2005 resulted in a similar experience and 
led to the resignation of President Carlos Mesa (Spronk and Webber, 2007: 38). 
 In addition to inspiring other movements in Bolivia, the water war inspired 
activists around the world fighting against corporate exploitation by showing what was 
made possible through widespread protest (Dangl, 2007: 70). The conflict symbolized the 
exploitation inherent in a model of corporate globalization that placed greater emphasis 
on the needs of corporations over the health of local populations. Rather than focusing 
solely on improving the municipal water system, the movement fought against 
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government forces and the neoliberal model, and continued to inspire social movements 
throughout the country (Dangl, 2007: 70).  
In 2000, the Cochabamba water war social movement put forward the idea of a 
radical Constituent Assembly that was meant to transform Bolivian political relations, 
economic structures, and government in the interest of the poor indigenous majority 
(Webber, 2011: 4). While the movement put forward radical and anti-neoliberal political 
ideas, this momentum did not translate into concrete results (Webber, 2011: 4). Similarly 
to the lack of success in democratically reforming SEMAPA, the assembly that was 
actually introduced by the 2006 Morales government ignored all revolutionary and 
participatory aspects of the assembly as envisioned by the water war movement. In 
contrast, to appeal to the elites of the Santa Cruz region, the assembly that was actually 
introduced by the government was similar to the structure of the congress (Webber, 2011: 
4). 
 Shortly after the Morales victory in 2005, the country held elections for delegates 
of the Constituent Assembly that was to re-write the Bolivian constitution (Postero, 2010: 
65). The MAS delegates, many of whom were indigenous or from the popular sector, won 
fifty-two percent of the seats. As this did not give MAS the two-thirds majority required 
to approve articles of the constitution, the general society knew the process would be 
challenging and controversial (Postero, 2010: 65). In 2006, shortly after the inauguration 
of the assembly in Sucre, MAS delegates voted to change the rules of the debate. MAS 
delegates authorized an absolute majority to approve all amendments other than the final 
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text. This change was considered a power grab as the general population believed the 
MAS attempted to obtain unfair control over the process (Postero, 2010: 65).   
 For months, opposition held large protests and boycotted the assembly and in 
December 2006, newspapers estimated that approximately 1,200 people were on hunger 
strikes (Postero, 2010: 66). In February 2007, the government and right-wing political 
parties reached an agreement that each article of the new constitution was to be approved 
first by the commission in charge of it, second by the entire body, and finally would go to 
the public referendum for approval of the full text. However, the tensions within the 
assembly never diminished, and commissions assigned to issues such as land reform and 
indigenous rights experienced significant divisions within debates and discussions 
(Postero, 2010: 66). 
 The method by which the new constitution was passed contrasted greatly with the 
democratic ideals encouraged by the water war movement. Many Bolivian citizens 
expressed concern over the undemocratic way the assembly was run, the attempted 
power-grab by the government, and most significantly, the fact that the MAS allowed the 
constitution to be passed in Oruru (Postero, 2010: 67). The idea that Morales and his 
ruling party had the ability to barter and negotiate with different actors within the 
assembly seemed to contradict claims that direct political democracy was integrated 
within this process. Other Bolivian citizens voiced concerns and fears over the emergence 
of an authoritarian or populist form of government, which a banner at a protest in Santa 
Cruz verbalized, “Evo, Assassin of Democracy” (Postero, 2010: 67). The version of the 
assembly as introduced by Morales directly contradicted the wider vision of direct 
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political participation as encouraged by leaders of the Coordinadora. Therefore, it is clear 
that the movement did not succeed in its broader goal of deepening democracy in Bolivia  
(Postero, 2010: 67). 
  During the movement, the Coordinadora’s ideas concerning direct political 
participation directly challenged Western notions of democracy (Olivera et al, 2004: 28-
29). Movement leaders encouraged an ongoing process of collective and communal 
political decision-making that directly challenged notions of Western superiority and 
hegemony in the region. The participation model enforced by the movement challenged 
the neoliberal policy of privatizing water that was part of a larger ideology of neoliberal 
governance constructed and enforced by IFIs such as the World Bank and the IMF, by 
Western governments and by multi-national corporations (Olivera et al, 2004: 28-29). In 
the model proposed by movement leaders, all Cochabamba residents took ownership over 




Despite the movement’s strong theoretical foundations and challenges to the neoliberal 
policy of privatizing water and more broadly, capitalism and imperialism, it is clear that 
the movement had significant practical shortcomings. The most significant was its 
inability to drastically improve the strength and coverage of the municipal water system. 
As a result, the movement failed in one of its most basic goals of improving water 
provision in Cochabamba which was directly connected to the expulsion of Aguas del 
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Tunari from the country and the reversal of the privatization contract. Movement leaders 
did not consider how union and company dynamics could impact their efforts to 
drastically reform the company to improve water access and the quality of the water 
system (Bakker, 2008: 239). 
While movement leaders had creative organizing strategies to bring together 
diverse populations to fight against the privatization of SEMAPA and the higher water 
prices, leaders did not have a clear plan in place following the reversal of the privatization 
contract. This illustrates how reversing privatization is only one step in establishing a 
successful public utility, and union and company dynamics must be considered when 
establishing reform attempts. Directly after the movement’s victory, water was provided 
by SEMAPA for only a few hours a day in many parts of the city, and services did not 
improve for those who were already customers of the utility (Spronk & Webber, 2007: 
21). 
 Most significantly, the movement’s victory did not transform national and 
international regulations that restricted the local autonomy of SEMAPA. While having 
the specific goal of reversing SEMAPA’s privatization enabled movement leaders to 
focus their efforts, it resulted in a neglect of the broader institutional structures that 
restricted the independent functioning and autonomy of SEMAPA. Movement leaders 
failed to acknowledge that the issues of SEMAPA were not solely restricted to local 
conditions found within the water company, but were connected to national, international, 
and global political and social institutions (Ochoa et al., 2009: 76). As a result, over time, 
movement activists acknowledged that expelling the transnational corporation, reversing 
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SEMAPA’s privatization, and reforming water legislation was only a small step in 
establishing true social control over a municipal water company within a political and 
economic environment that favoured corporate needs over the health and wellbeing of 
local populations (Spronk and Webber, 2007: 41). 
In addition, leaders of the Coordinadora considered the SEMAPA union as the 
main barrier to implementing real reform and processes of public participation within the 
public utility (Spronk, 2009: 168). Public sector unions in Bolivia failed to prevent the 
privatization of public services and there was no national federation for water workers 
(Spronk, 2009: 171). As a result, SEMAPA workers were represented in the Union 
Confederation of Light, Electricity, Telecommunications, Water and Gas Workers of 
Bolivia. Members of the federation were not vocal about issues of privatization, and as a 
result, there were few resources put into establishing creative organizing efforts with 
SEMAPA workers during the movement (Spronk, 2009: 172) 
 
Conclusion 
The thesis of this study is that the Coordinadora halted the neoliberal agenda to privatize 
water in Cochabamba, Bolivia through achieving its basic goals of reversing the 
privatization of SEMAPA and ejecting Aguas del Tunari from Bolivia. The movement 
challenged the neoliberal agenda of privatizing water through becoming a symbol for the 
international campaign for the human right to water, transforming the Bolivian political 
landscape, transferring more attention to communal water rights and inspiring other 
movements protesting the privatization of water (Spronk and Webber, 2007: 21; Shultz, 
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2008: 29; Boelens, Getches and Guevara-Gill, 2010: 288; Spronk, 2009:169, and Dangl, 
2007: 70). The success of the movement to stop the privatization of water was contingent 
on leaders’ abilities to organize broad and diverse populations through the use of open 
and public assemblies based on principles and practices of direct political participation 
and democracy (Olivera et al, 2004: 56-57).  Despite the movement’s successes, it did not 
achieve its broader goals of radically democratizing SEMAPA, of expanding water 
access, and of improving the quality of services under the SEMAPA system (Spronk and 
Webber, 2007: 41).  
To protest the privatization of water in Cochabamba in 2000, movement leaders 
mobilized workers, peasants, children, the elderly, labour leaders, business people, 
community organizations, irrigator associations, water cooperatives and middle class 
citizens into one unified movement (Olivera et al, 2004: 34). To do so, Oscar Olivera 
formed the Coordinadora to enhance democratic decision-making by monitoring and 
challenging government and business actions, interpreting the demands of the general 
population and leading mass protests to challenge oppressive government policies 
(Olivera et al, 2004: 28-29). 
 This thesis illustrates how on an ideological level the movement successfully 
challenged the expansion of the neoliberal policy of privatizing water in Bolivia by 
introducing political processes and practices involving direct political participation and 
democracy. The movement’s success in reversing SEMAPA’s privatization and in 
utilizing diverse protest methods also encouraged Bolivian citizens to question political 
processes that were imposed by external forces, instead of blindly accepting national 
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political structures. This process was illustrated numerous times through diverse social 
movements protesting the privatization of hydrocarbons in the country, leading to the 
forced resignation of two neoliberal presidents in 2003 and 2005, and to the election of 
the country’s first indigenous and socialist president, Evo Morales. However, while the 
movement had significant impacts on the political consciousness of Bolivians, it did not 
drastically reform SEMAPA based on principles of direct participation and democracy, it 
did not improve the quality of services and it did not expand access to water under the 
utility.   
 
Recommendations for future research 
Future research on the political and social significance of the Cochabamba water war 
could expand the study period to analyze how the victory influences the present political, 
social, economic and legal environment in Bolivia. This research could be completed 
through extensive field research in Cochabamba and other major Bolivian cities. This 
could involve interviews with social movement and labour leaders, NGOs, municipal 
government officials, and members of irrigator associations. These interviews would 
ascertain whether the water war victory significantly influenced the current political 
environment in the country and whether it represented a practical challenge to the 
neoliberal policy of privatization. Additionally, this research could be expanded through 
interviewing the main leaders of the social movement to understand their views and 
opinions on the national and global significance of the victory. 
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Postscript: Current issues of water provision in Cochabamba 
Following the water war victory, the challenge of developing alternative models to water 
privatization continues to be prominent in Cochabamba (Achtenberg, 2013). In the past, 
even though the Morales government has been verbally opposed to the policies of IFIs, it 
has also actively encouraged multinational investment in extractive industries such as in 
the mining, oil, forestry and water sectors. Extractive industries negatively impact water 
usage and reduce access to the general Bolivian population. These industries require 
significant water usage and can impinge on the natural environments of indigenous 
communities in the Bolivian amazon region (Harris et al, 2013: 13). 
While the re-nationalized SEMAPA has more than tripled its service area since 
the water war victory, approximately forty percent of the city’s residents, mostly in the 
hilly southern districts, still lack access to water and sanitation services. Families who are 
outside SEMAPA’s current service area are required to pay five to ten times higher than 
SEMAPA’s customers to have water of inconsistent quality trucked into the rural 
communities. Even for families connected to the municipal system, water services are 
intermittent and water quality is inconsistent (Achtenberg, 2013). 
 Although the re-nationalized SEMAPA includes representatives elected by the 
community, problems of corruption, mismanagement and inefficiency continue to reduce 
the effectiveness of the organization. In 2010, for example, the company was forced to 
lay off one hundred and fifty workers to overcome a three million dollar deficit that was 
believed to be the result of payroll padding, thefts, and clandestine connections 
(Achtenberg, 2013). As a result of frustration with both public and private models of 
  129 
water provision, residents in the southern zones have established participatory water 
systems with varying relationships with SEMAPA. These cooperatives, community 
councils, and elected water committees try to buy water in bulk from SEMAPA while 
obtaining control over distribution in the communities (Achtenberg, 2013).  
Since approximately a decade following the water war victory, urban water supply 
in the city of Cochabamba has not improved substantially (Marston, 2014,: 72). The re-
nationalized public utility, SEMAPA still fails to provide water to the peri-urban 
Southern area of the city, which is home to the city’s poorest residents (Marston, 2014, p. 
72). Since the 2000 water war, residents in the city’s southern zone have publicly 
demonstrated to demand municipal water and sanitation services. Residents have come up 
with a variety of proposals to address the lack of access to safe drinking water for 
productive and domestic use (Bustamante, 2012: 90). Water vendors have become 
important in the southern zones, as they arrive in communities by truck with large water 
tanks to deliver water to the families. However, it is difficult for water trucks to access the 
poorest neighbourhoods because of a lack of paved roads, and poorer families are 
required to pay up to four times more for their water than wealthy families who have 
access to the municipal water system (Bustamante, 2012: 90). 
 In District 9 of Cochabamba, only twenty percent of families have access to 
sanitation services, forcing families to use other methods to dispose of their wastewater. 
This is affecting both surface and ground water in the area, making the provision of water 
services even more unreliable for poorer families (Bustamante, 2012: 90). In District 9, 
the two main sources of water are water sellers and community tanks, which are 
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supplemented by water from nearby rivers and canals when there is an insufficient supply 
from private sellers. Additionally, people collect rainwater to wash or cook and others 
buy bottled water. However, these methods do not provide enough water for domestic 
uses, and canals and rivers are not sufficient during the dry season, making it difficult for 
families to maintain vegetable gardens or to raise farm animals (Bustamante, 2012: 90). 
 An example of a community-based water system seeking to fill the gap left by 
SEMAPA is Villa Israel’s common pool water system with water provided by two wells 
approximately thirty minutes away from the community (Wutich, 2009: 183). The system 
and water are independently operated and owned by the community. The system is 
managed by Villa Israel’s local government and only community residents are eligible to 
receive water from the wells and to participate in the governance of the community water 
system (Wutich, 2009: 183).  
Despite successes of some of these community-based water systems, many do not 
provide an adequate supply of water to meet the daily needs of households and families 
(Wutich, 2009, p. 183). Additionally, in some informal squatter settlements, water 
sources disappear permanently, dry out seasonally, or are contaminated, leading to an 
insufficient supply of water to meet the needs of families in the area. Significantly, these 
systems are vulnerable to environmental challenges and stressors such as drought, 
desertification, population growth and climate change (Wutich, 2009: 183). 
In conclusion, discussions concerning municipal water governance have stalled in 
recent years (Marston, 2014: 81). Many people have a vision of an expanded and 
improved public water company that extends to the most isolated areas of the city, 
  131 
reaching the most marginalized populations. Based on this perspective, community water 
systems are seen as temporary institutions that will exist until the municipal network can 
provide universal water access to its entire service area (Marston, 2014, p. 81). However, 
members of community water systems do not trust the state to provide consistent water 
access. Actors within these organizations insist that any reform of municipal water 
governance must include these community-based systems through a scheme of co-
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